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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW'

In Citizens Bank of Weirton v. West Virginia Board of Banking and FinancialInstitutions,2 the Supreme Court of Appeals examined the requirement of the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act that agency decisions in contested cases be accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law.3 A savings and loan
company applied to the Board of Banking and Financial Institutions to change its name and to change the nature of its business
to a corporation with general banking powers. The appellant intervened in the matter, protesting the application of the savings and
loan company. After investigation and a hearing, the Board approved the savings and loan company's application. The Board's
order was affirmed on appeal to the circuit court, but the Supreme
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the Board,
holding that the Board's final order did not comply with the findings requirement of the Administrative Procedures Act.
The court noted that "[t]he grand design of administrative
law is to guarantee the rationality of the process through which the
I Another administrative law case North v. West Virginia Board of Regents,

233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977), is discussed in the constitutional law section of this
survey.
2 233 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1977).
W. VA. CODE § 29A-5-3 (1976 Replacement Vol.) provides that:
Every final order or decision rendered by an agency in a contested case shall
be in writing or stated in the record and shall be accompanied by findings of fact
and conclusions of law.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1977

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

results are determined, and thereby help guarantee the rationality
of the results." 4 To aid reviewing courts in fulfilling their obligation
to preserve the rationality of the administrative decision-making
process, the Administrative Procedures Act requires that an
agency decision in a contested case be accompanied by a statement
of the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the agency
in reaching its decision. In the instant case, the Board attempted
to comply with the findings requirement by simply restating the
statutory language regarding approval of applications for bank
charters. The court held the Board's statement to be an insufficient statement of its findings of fact to permit evaluation of the
Board's order by a reviewing court, and directed the Board to enter
a decision in accordance with the findings requirement.
In setting forth what the Board's order should include to satisfy the requirement, the court said:
When we are concerned with very complex cases involving evidence which cannot adequately be evaluated by laymen, or
when we are concerned with cases involving an intricate interfacing of fact-finding and policy making, the ideal order would
set forth: (1) the agency's basic value judgments which are dictated by its interpretation of the statutory purposes; (2) the
random facts which have been presented to the agency in support of various positions which the agency determines to be
relevant to the agency decision; (3) the methodology by which
those facts have been evaluated, i.e., credibility of witnesses,
validity of tests and statistical data, accuracy of expert predictions, etc.; (4) an integrating theory which organizes the random evidentiary facts in an intelligent and comprehensible
way; and, (5) a conclusion based upon the theory developed,
supported by the facts, concerning whether a proposed action
is in furtherance of the purposes set forth in the statute, along
with an explanation of any change in agency policy from former
practice.While recognizing that the complexity of an agency decision would
be determined by the complexity of the issues involved, the court
noted that "in every contested case, W. Va. Code, § 29A-5-31 contemplates a decision in which the agency sets forth the underlying
evidentiary facts which lead the agency to its conclusion, along
233 S.E.2d at 725.
Id. at 726.
W.VA. CODE § 29A-5-3 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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with an explanation of the methodology by which any complex,
statistical, or economic evidence was evaluated." 7
I Id. at 727.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW8
State ex rel. Whitman v. Fox' involved various constitutional
challenges to the West Virginia conspiracy statute,'" election fraud
statute," and the procedure followed by the Logan County Circuit
8 Other cases dealing with Constitutional Law decided in 1977 included: State
v. Boyd, 233 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1977) (constitutional provisions governing due
process and self-incrimination of criminal defendant were infringed by interrogation at trial as to reason defendant had not earlier disclosed a defense); Menon v.
Davis Memorial Associates, Inc., 235 S.E.2d 817 (W. Va. 1977) (civil plaintiff's
rights to due process violated when trial court ruled on the merits of the case
without affording plaintiff an opportunity to present evidence in his behalf); State
ex rel. Hutzler v. Dostert, 236 S.E.2d 336 (W. Va. 1977) (bail, which must be
determined on a case by case basis, deemed to be excessive as to named defendant
and his charged offense, thus violating constitutional prohibition against excessive
bail); Smoot v. Dingess, 236 S.E.2d 468 (W. Va. 1977) (defendant may not be
incarcerated for either civil or criminal contempt upon unsworn testimony and
notice of the contempt hearing should be given to the real party in interest); O'Neil
v. Parkersburg and Hendrickson v. Parkersburg, 237 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1977)
(notice of claim provision that right of victim of governmental tort feasor to sue is
absolutely barred should he not give required notices to municipality within thirty
days after his cause of action has accrued, violated equal protection and due process
clauses and were unconstitutional); Mason County Board of Education v. State
Superintendent of Schools, 234 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1977) (county board of education had standing to obtain judicial review of an order of the State Superintendent
of Schools requiring the reinstatement of an employee); State ex rel. Preacher v.
Sencindiver, 233 S.E.2d 425 (W. Va. 1977) (upheld constitutionality of W. Va. Code
§ 61-2-1 (1977 Replacement Vol.), felony murder statute, as not erecting an impermissible inference of motive, willfulness and premeditation); State ex rel. State
Building Commission v. Casey, 232 S.E.2d 349 (W. Va. 1977) (statute providing for
rent-free use of state property by a private corporation is an unconstitutional grant
of the credit of the State to such corporation); State ex rel. Kanawha County
Building Commission v. Paterno, 233 S.E.2d 332 (W. Va. 1977) (acquisition and
construction by the commission of annex through issuance of bonds payable from
severence tax revenues were not violative of constitutional provisions limiting contracting of state debts or those granting the state's credit to a county, or those
limiting the contracting of county debts); Anderson v. George, 233 S.E.2d 407 (W.
Va. 1977) (declared W. VA. CODE § 7-10-4 (1976 Replacement Vol.) unconstitutional
because statute did not provide for pre-seizure or post-seizure hearing on the validity of humane officer's statutory powers); State ex rel. Cogar v. Kidd, 234 S.E.2d
899 (W. Va. 1977) (declared portion of embezzlement statute, W. VA. CODE § 61-320 (1977 Replacement Vol.) which caused certain presumptions of guilt to be raised,
unconstitutional; statute deemed severable with the rest of it remaining valid);
State ex rel. Piccirillo v. Follansbee, 233 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1977) (property qualification for candidacy in municipal elections unconstitutional as violative of equal
protection, W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17).
236 S.E.2d 565 (W. Va. 1977).
W.VA. CODE § 61-10-31 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
W. VA. CODE § 3-9-1 (1971 Replacement Vol.).
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Court. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia struck
down as void for vagueness a portion of W. Va. Code § 61-10-3112
upheld the indictments based upon the election fraud statute,
struck down the joint trial procedure followed by the lower court,
and upheld the grand jury selection process followed by the Commissioners of Logan County. The case was based on alleged election irregularities and fraud practiced by the defendants in the
1976 general election.
W. Va. Code § 61-10-31 (2) 13 made it a felony for anyone to
attempt to defraud the State, a county, a municipality, or a board
of education. The Court struck down this portion of the statute as
void for vagueness since it could not possibly apprise a man of what
conduct was deemed criminal under this statute. The West Virginia court pointed to its responsibility in upholding individual
rights when there was a constitutional infirmity in a statute, regardless of the motive of the Legislature in passing that statute."
The Court declared this portion of the statute void even though a
similar federal conspiracy statute had long been upheld as constitutional. The West Virginia court noted that due process required
that a criminal statute must be sufficiently definite," and part (2)
of the West Virginia conspiracy statute was fatally lacking in such
definiteness.
However, part (1) was not struck down and was deemed in
force so as to support the indictments based upon it. That portion
of the conspiracy statute made it a felony to conspire to commit
certain offenses which were defined in other sections of the Code.
Noting that the statute was severable, that portion of the statute
dealing with offenses against the State 6 was valid and continued
in effect.
The joint defendants had moved for separate trials in the
lower court and the lower court had refused such motion on the
grounds of efficiency and economy. The Supreme Court held that
individual interests in fairness and justice so far outweighed inter§ 61-10-31 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
§ 61-10-31(2) (1977 Replacement Vol.).
, 236 S.E.2d 565 at 569.
's In State v. Flinn, 208 S.E.2d 538 (W. Va. 1974), the Court held that a
criminal statute had to be definite enough to give an ordinary person fair notice
that contemplated conduct is prohibited and to provide adequate standards for
adjudication.
11236 S.E.2d at 571.
12 W. VA. CODE
22

W. VA. CODE
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ests in economy as to make individual trials constitutionally mandated unless the joint defendants knowingly acquiesce in a joint
trial.
The petitioners had alleged that the basis of selection of jurors
for the special grand jury to investigate elections did not provide
for an adequate representation of a full cross-section of society.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals expressly adopted
the Castaneda7 standards for deciding whether a grand jury excluded a minority group. These standards include: the petitioner
must establish racial identity or group identity; his group must be
proven to have been singled out for different treatment under the
laws; and this group must have been under represented on a grand
jury (in proportion to representation in the population as a whole)
over a significant number of years. By establishing these factors,
the burden is shifted to the State to prove that the grand jury
selection process is not discriminatory. The petitioners in
Whitman failed to establish any of these factors and thus a complete hearing on the jury selection process was deemed unnecessary.
In Moore v. McKenzie,"' the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals denied a post-conviction habeas corpus writ.'" The petitioner was a parolee who two years previously had pleaded guilty
to attempted rape.2 The rape statute then in force 2' provided for
different terms of imprisonment for males convicted of carnal
knowledge of a female under sixteen than for females convicted of
carnal knowledge of a male under sixteen. Men convicted of statutory rape could have received a much heavier sentence than
women convicted of a similar offense. The Moore court upheld the
continuing vitality of convictions based upon this since-repealed
statute because the gender-based classification served an important and rational governmental objective and was designed to remedy a specific evil." The classification of the former rape statute
,7 Castaneda v. Partida, 97 S.Ct. 1272 (1977).
236 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1977).
" W. VA. CODE § 53-4A-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977) authorizes post-conviction habeas
corpus proceedings.
" W. VA. CODE § 61-11-8 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
", W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1 to -13 (1977 Replacement Vol.) since repealed and
replaced by W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8B-1 to -13 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
2 For the proper standards in determining whether a classification is valid and
rational, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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was upheld in 1976,23 and the Court pointed out that no new considerations had arisen since its determination of the Rasnake case
to cause the Court to strike down convictions under the former
statute. The Moore case summarily dispensed with petitioner's
contention that a bifurcated trial system should be instituted by
noting that petitioner had cited no specific abuses within the unitary trial system.
State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine24 was a habeas corpus proceeding in which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals laid
down guidelines for the application of the West Virginia Code dealing with the definition and punishment of delinquent children2 in
order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process, equal
protection, and prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.2" A
minor child from Calhoun County, after a hearing where the child
had counsel present, was adjudged delinquent and committed to
Pruntytown. The minor alleged several constitutional defects in
the delinquency proceeding relying mainly on equal protection and
due process arguments.
The court deemed the juvenile laws in question not inherently
unconstitutional, but because of their broad language, there were
enormous potentialities for unconstitutional application. Furthermore, it was decided that it was the court's responsibility to lay
down specific guidelines for the constitutional application of the
statutes.
The Harris court pointed out that, by statute: 27 (1) a juvenile
defendant in a delinquency proceeding is entitled to counsel at
trial and appeal; (2) an indigent juvenile has a right to appointed
counsel; and (3) all parties, particularly parents or guardians,
must be fully informed of their rights and have a reasonable time
to confer with counsel. Any delinquency petition must allege facts
giving fair notice of the charges."
The Court then noted that as far as due process and equal
protection are concerned, the legislature must choose a proper
See, State ex rel. Rasnake v. Narick, 227 S.E.2d 203 (W. Va. 1976).
S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1977).
' W. VA. CODE § 49-1-4 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (definition of delinquent child);
W. VA. CODE § 49-5-11 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (disposition of delinquent child.).
2

21 233

26 W. VA. CONST. art. I1,

§§

5, 10.

W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
State ex rel. Wilson v. Bambrick, 156 W. Va. 703, 195 S.E.2d 721 (1973).
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means for achieving a rational purpose and the means chosen must
not be discriminatory as to race, sex, creed or national origin. The
cruel and unusual punishment standard requires that no one be
punished unless he has done an act deserving of punishment, and
that the punishment be proportionate to the offense.
The court based much of its discussion in the Harris case on
status offenders, those who are punished for acts which if committed by an adult would not be crimes. Status offenders were given
a special position in the West Virginia juvenile scheme and any
treatment of them by the state fell within the state's power as
parenspatriae,not the plenary punishment power. 29 Therefore, the
scheme had to provide for their aid, not their punishment, otherwise the classification as status offender was invidious discrimination. The court also declared summarily that the scheme discriminated against females.
Under the due process standard, the court declared that status
offenders could not be incarcerated in a prison-like facility except
when there is no reasonable alternative. The Harris court analogized the treatment of incarcerated juveniles to the treatment of the
incarcerated mentally ill." In applying the cruel and unusual punishment standard to the West Virginia scheme, the Harris court
noted that punishment must be proportionate to any offense committed. Therefore, since status offenders have not committed a
criminal offense, to incarcerate them in a prison-like facility with
criminal children is to inflict upon status offenders a constitutionally prohibited disproportionate penalty. Therefore a delinquent
child may not be confined with children guilty of criminal conduct.
If a status offender is to be confined in a prison-like facility, it must
be one dedicated solely to status offenders. In deciding whether or
not there is a reasonable alternative to a prison-like facility, the
court is to look at the facilities available and those which could be
available with state expenditure and with consideration of the
state budget.
Gooden v. Board of Appeals 3' affirmed the decision of a lower
court reinstating a state trooper to the position from which he was
discharged and ordering him to receive back pay. Trooper Gooden
was discharged from his position after making a speech that the
" State ex rel. Slatton v. Boles, 147 W. Va. 674, 130 S.E.2d 192 (1963).
" 233 S.E.2d 318 at 326-29.
, 234 S.E.2d 893 (W. Va. 1977).
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Department of Public Safety believed violated departmental regulations. In 1975, the trooper was ordered reinstated by the Kanawha County Circuit Court and the department brought this appeal.
The regulations upon which the department fired Gooden
were found to be overly broad and void of vagueness and thus
unconstitutional because the regulations impermissibly burdened
free speech and first amendment rights without giving a rational
reason for the burden. The regulations were also deemed to be too
broadly worded and thus incapable of giving fair notice of what
speech was not allowed.
On the authority of Erznoznik v. Jacksonville3 Trooper
Gooden had standing to raise the constitutional issues because he
had asserted a real and substantial violation of his and others'
constitutional rights. After deciding the petitioner had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the regulations, the Gooden court
examined the regulations in question to see if they were so vague
as not to afford fair notice to the ordinary man that his conduct
was prohibited. The statute must be definite in order to satisfy due
process.3 The court noted that public employees do not lose their
first amendment rights by being entered on the state's payroll and
are entitled to all of the due process procedural safeguards. Therefore, the regulations circumscribing their conduct must also be as
definite as any statute which attempts to circumscribe the conduct
of the public at large, in order to satisfy due process. These regulations failed to meet the test of definiteness and the firing of
Trooper Gooden based on the overly broad regulations could not
be upheld because that firing violated his first amendment rights
and the requirement of procedural due process.
In North v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 34 the summary
expulsion of a fourth-year medical student was remanded to the
circuit court because the procedure followed by the West Virginia
University School of Medicine violated the constitutional requirements of due process, because the interest of the student in obtaining a medical education with concomitant financial rewards was a
sufficient property interest to be entitled to procedural safeguards.
North was expelled from the West Virginia University School
422 U.S. 205 (1975).
3 234 S.E.2d at 896, citing, State v. Flinn, 208 S.E.2d 538 (W. Va. 1974).
31233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977).
32
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of Medicine because of allegations concerning falsification of statements made in his application to the school. There were two hearings before the expulsion. No formal statement of the charges
against North was given to him until after the second hearing. The
student appealed to the Board of Regents after his expulsion
(which came after his second hearing), and the Board ordered a
third hearing. North's attorney, obtained after the first hearing
was not permitted to attend either of the subsequent hearings. At
that hearing, North admitted some of the allegations but refused
to plead guilty to any of the charges made against him. The Committee on Student Discipline considered that he had indeed made
a guilty plea to the allegations that he had deliberately falsified his
previous academic record to gain admittance into medical school,
and North was again expelled. After this second expulsion was
upheld by the Board of Regents, petitioner prosecuted this appeal
through the Kanawha County Circuit Court to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals.
Traditionally, attending college was a matter of privilege and
a student was without recourse if he was summarily expelled. However, later cases recognized that a student, regardless of the level
of education, has a property or liberty right in obtaining education,
and in protecting one's reputation so as to entitle the student to
at least some procedural safeguards against arbitrary action by the
educational institution, which action violates the due process standard.15
The North court concluded that the student's petition showed
a sufficient liberty and property interest so as to entitle him to the
due process protection under the West Virginia and federal constitutions. It then determined the amount of due process procedure
necessary in a case of this sort, involving deprivation of a liberty
or property interest. The court noted that the range of liberty and
property interests which may be unduly affected by arbitrary state
action is infinite.
However, the North court wrote that essential to the requirements of due process in this sort of case was an orderly hearing,
either before the deprivation of the property interest or promptly
after the deprivation, giving the aggrieved party a fuller measure
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), which protected high school students
from summary expulsion for "disruptive conduct" in the absence of the application
of due process standards.
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of due process.36 Other than this elementary safeguard, the court
noted that what is due process for a given factual situation must
be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, there are certain
fundamental principles to be followed.
In a case such as this where the punishment was as severe as
expulsion with cancellation of credits earned, the amount of due
process procedure must be substantial. Among the safeguards the
student was entitled to are: formal written notice of the charges;
opportunity to prepare a defense; opportunity to retain counsel;
opportunity to have counsel present at any hearing to confront
accusers and present evidence on the student's behalf; an unbiased
tribunal and an adequate record. The court distinguished an expulsion from a short suspension, and held that where the punishment involved is a short suspension, oral notice and an informal
hearing are enough.37 Because no record was taken at any of
North's hearings, the lower court was authorized on remand to
conduct its own investigation of the procedure followed by the
West Virginia University officials, rather than being limited to a
review of a scanty, virtually non-existent record.
31See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
31 233 S.E.2d at 417-18.
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CONTRACTS
In Board of Education v. W. Harley Miller, Inc.,3" the Supreme Court of Appeals was asked to decide "whether the circuit
court has jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration award upon a motion for summary judgment by the party prevailing at arbitration." 19 In previous litigation between the parties here involved,
the Board of Education instituted a declaratory judgment action
to determine whether the contract between the parties required
submission of their dispute to arbitration before either party
could resort to the courts. The circuit court issued a preliminary
injunction against the contractor to prohibit him from proceeding
to arbitration until the declaratory judgment action was resolved.
On appeal of the injunction order, the Supreme Court of Appeals
ordered the injunction dissolved and the declaratory judgment
action abated, ruling that, under the contract, arbitration was a
condition precedent to any right of action."
Thereafter, the dispute was submitted to arbitration, and an
award was made by the arbitrators in favor of the contractor. The
contractor filed a Petition to Enforce Award of Arbitrators "n the
abated declaratory judgment action. The petition was treated as
a motion for summary judgment, but the circuit court refused to
grant the motion on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction. The
circuit court certified the jurisdictional question to the Supreme
Court of Appeals.
The court held that the circuit court had jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award upon the motion for summary judgment.' Although the majority opinion does not make the basis of
its ruling clear, it is assumed from the concurring opinion that the
court's holding permitted the contractor to enforce the arbitration
award by filing an amendment to the abated declaratory judgment
action, and moving for summary judgment.4 2 It also appears that
in the usual case, where there has been no abatement of prior
litigation, an arbitration award "is enforceable upon a complaint
setting forth the contract, the arbitration provision, and the award
236 S.E.2d 439 (W. Va. 1977).
3' Id. at 441.
Board of Education v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 221 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va. 1975).
' 236 S.E.2d at 447-48.
Id. at 451-52 (concurring opinion).
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of the arbitrators' ' upon
a motion for summary judgment made at
3
the proper time. 1
In what the concurring opinion classifies as "mere dicta," ' the
majority opinion primarily concerned itself with pointing the law
in West Virginia regarding the enforceability of standard arbitration clauses in commercial contracts in a new direction. The majority found that the common law concepts of revocability and
condition precedent, express or implied, which had previously
been used by the courts in determining the enforceability of arbitration clauses were archaic and confusing. The majority opinion
enounce[s] a new rule of law which is generally consistent with
the results in prior cases . . . . Where parties to a contract
agree to arbitrate either all disputes or particular limited disputes arising under the contract, and where the parties bargained for the arbitration provision, then, arbitration is mandatory, and any causes of action under the contract which by the
contract terms are made arbitrable are merged, in the absence
of fraud, with the arbitration award and the arbitration award
is enforceable upon a complaint setting forth the contract, the
arbitration provision, and the award of the arbitrators upon
motion for summary judgment made at the proper time.45
The majority places great emphasis on the requirement that
the agreement to arbitrate have been bargained for by the parties. To the general rule of enforceability of agreements to arbitrate, the court notes three instances where a clause will be found
unenforceable because not bargained for: (1) in the traditional
contracts of adhesion situation; (2) where a party can bring an
arbitration clause within the unconscionability provision of W. Va.
Code § 46-2-302; and, (3) when it appears from the nature of the
contract that arbitration is wholly inappropriate and could only
have been intended to defeat just claims.46 Despite recognizing
these exceptions, the court concludes that "all arbitration provisions in all coitracts which indicate that the parties intended to
arbitrate their differences rather than litigate them are presumptively binding, and specifically enforceable."4
:3

Id. at 447.

"Id. at 452 (concurring opinion).
's
'6

Id. at 447.
Id.

Id. at 447-48.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1977

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE48
As has been true in the past, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals dealt extensively in the area of criminal law and procedure in 1977. Several important decisions having potentially wideranging impact were rendered, including cases of first impression
and cases constituting a reversal of previous judicial thinking in
this State. The court, as presently constituted, appears to be continuing its recent liberal trend of progressive interpretation of the
law to protect the rights of the criminally accused.
I.

IMPEACHMENT: PRE-TRIAL SILENCE & PRIOR CONVICTIONS

Although more appropriately classified as evidentiary, two
cases which were handed down concerning impeachment of the
testimony of the accused will have a great impact in the criminal
law area.
In State v. Boyd,49 defendant Boyd turned himself in to the
police, admitted to a shooting, and told where he had thrown the
gun away. After being advised of his rights, Boyd chose to remain
silent. At trial, Boyd asserted self-defense. Over objections, the
prosecutor sought to impeach Boyd on cross-examination by asking why he had not made his defense known to the police and why
he changed his story as to where he threw the gun. The prosecutor
subsequently referred to this in his closing argument to the jury.
On appeal, the conviction was reversed, the court holding, on
constitutional grounds," that it was reversible error for a trial court
to permit cross-examination of a defendant as to his pre-trial silence.5'
It is well established in West Virginia, as a corollary to an
" The following cases concerning criminal law and procedure will not be discussed in this survey: State ex rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver, 233 S.E.2d 425 (W. Va.
1977) (murder statute constitutional); Moore v. McKenzie, 236 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va.
1977) (old rape statute not unconstitutional on the basis of equal protection); and
State ex rel. Hutzler v. Dostert, 236 S.E.2d 336 (W. Va. 1977) (plurality opinion)
(excessive bail).
41233 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1977). For further discussion of this case see text
accompanying notes 11-12, infra.
0 W. VA. CONST. art. Ill, §§ 5, 10 which read, respectively, "[N]or shall any
person, in any criminal case, be compelled to be a witness against himself. ..."
and "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law, and the judgment of his peers."
11233 S.E.2d at 716.
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accused's right against self-incrimination, that a prosecutor is precluded from using, in order to show or infer guilt, either defendant's failure to testify at trial, 5 - or his pre-trial silence during the
custodial period.53 Boyd extends this protection by also prohibiting
the use of pre-trial silence to impeach the credibility of a defendant
on the witness stand.
The decision brought West Virginia into substantial compliance with the United States Supreme Court ruling in Doyle v.
Ohio,54 which held that the use, for impeachment purposes, of a
defendant's silence, at the time of his arrest after having received
his Miranda warnings, violated the due process clause of the Four55
teenth Amendment.
The rationale underlying both Boyd and Doyle is twofold.
First, silence in the wake of being advised of one's Miranda rights
is "insolubly ambiguous." 6 Second, it would be fundamentally
unfair to allow an accused's silence to be used as an impeachment
tool since the Miranda warnings implicitly assure that no penalty
will attach to the exercise of those rights, including the right to
silence." The Boyd court also felt that allowing impeachment in
this manner ran counter to the presumption of innocence guaranteed a criminal defendant."
The court also concluded that the State may still impeach a
defendant with pre-trial statements inconsistent with his trial testimony if the court finds, out of the presence of the jury, that the
statements were "voluntary in the Miranda sense." 5
52 See, e.g., State v. Bragg, 140 W. Va. 585, 87 S.E.2d 689 (1955); State v.
Jones, 108 W. Va. 264, 150 S.E. 728 (1929); State v. Costa, 101 W. Va. 466, 132 S.E.
869 (1926).
0 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); State v. Fortner, 150 W. Va. 571,
148 S.E.2d 669 (1966).
426 U.S. 610 (1976).
Id. at 619.
' Id. at 617; 233 S.E.2d at 715.
426 U.S. at 618; 233 S.E.2d at 715.
"' 233 S.E.2d at 716. See also Pinkerton v. Farr, 220 S.E.2d 682 (W. Va. 1975).
' 233 S.E.2d at 716. It is unclear whether this statement was part of the

holding or dicta, since there were inconsistencies in Boyd's statements to the police

and his trial testimony. Assuming the language to be a holding, the limitation to
statements found voluntary "in the Mirandasense" appears to be misplaced. Voluntary in the Mirandasense is a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of rights.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-72, 475 (1966). However, the United States
Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971), held that pre-trial
statements made without benefit of the Miranda warnings, although inadmissible
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The second case dealing with impeachment, State v.
McA boy,6" also wrought an important change in the criminal jurisprudence of West Virginia. During his murder trial, McAboy took
the witness stand in his own defense. Over objection, the prosecutor was permitted to attempt impeachment of McAboy's credibility by questioning him as to a prior felony conviction. He appealed
his conviction of second degree murder.
The court held that evidence of prior convictions to impeach
the credibility of a criminal defendant who elects to testify would
no longer be admissible,' with two exceptions: (1) when the defendant himself places his good character and reputation in issue; or
(2) when the prior conviction is for perjury or false swearing.2 With
this decision, West Virginia is placed among a small minority of
jurisdictions adhering to this rule.63
A long line of cases beginning with State v. Friedman4 were
overruled where inconsistent, and the rule as stated in State v.
White65 and State v. Webb"6 was reinstated. The reason the court
had changed directions in Friedmanwas the 1931 amendment of
West Virginia Code § 57-3-617 which was felt to change the prior
convictions evidentiary rule. The present court, however, determined that the Friedman interpretation was unwarranted, and
therefore reinstituted the previous rule of disallowing evidence of
prior convictions for impeachment of the accused."
Although declining to reach the constitutional issue, the court
cited, as a factor in its decision, the chilling effect the old rule had
as part of the case in chief, were nonetheless admissible for impeaching the defendant's credibility where these statements were inconsistent with trial testimony.
The only condition is that the statements be made under such circumstances as to
be "trustworthy". Id. at 224. In light of this, Boyd appears to go too far.
60 236 S.E.2d 431 (W. Va. 1977).
Id. at 432.
62 Id. at 437.
63 There is wide

diversity among the rules of the other states, ranging from
limitations to crimes of moral turpitude or felonies, to judicial discretion, or admissibility of all past crimes. See 3A J. WIMORE, Evidence § 987 (Chadbourn rev.
1970) (collecting cases) and C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §
43, at 85 (2d ed. 1972).
60 124 W. Va. 4, 18 S.E.2d 653 (1942).
81 W. Va. 516, 94 S.E. 972 (1918).
66 99 W. Va. 225, 128 S.E. 97 (1925).
W. VA. CODE § 57-3-6 (1966). See note 3, supra.
66 124 W. Va. 4, 6-7, 18 S.E.2d 653, 655 (1942).
236 S.E.2d 431, 432-34.
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on a defendant with a criminal record, who must decide whether
to take the witness stand in his own defense. 0 This prejudicial
effect, coupled with sociological evidence of higher conviction rates
for defendants who did not take the stand,7' was an important
factor in the result reached.
The rule, subjecting use of prior convictions to impeach ordinary witnesses' testimony to the trial judge's discretion,72 was carefully distinguished and left intact in McAboy.73 The reasoning was
that evidence of prior convictions would only cause ordinary witnesses some personal embarrassment, while the prejudicial effect
on an accused could be an unwarranted conviction.74
I.

75

DEFENDANT'S RIGHT OF PRESENCE

State v. Boyd"6 is also important for its clarification of an
accused's rights to presence and confrontation of witnesses against
him. The relevant facts are that an objection was made by the
prosecutor during the closing argument of defense counsel. The
trial court, in considering the objection, invited counsel into chambers. Boyd was not present at this hearing and no record was made
70Id. at 436. For a good discussion of this problem, see Note,

THE UsE OF PiOR

71 W. Va. L.
Rev. 160 (1969).
" 236 S.E.2d at 435-436. See H. KALviN & H. ZEIGEL, THE AMEICAN JUR 160,
Y
Tables 43, 52 (1966).
72 See e.g., State v. Justice, 135 W. Va. 852, 65 S.E.2d 743 (1951); State v.
Crummit, 123 W. Va. 36, 13 S.E.2d 757 (1941); State v. Price, 113 W. Va. 326, 167
S.E. 862 (1933).
,1 236 S.E.2d at 437.
CONVICTIONS TO IMPEACH THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT,

74 Id.
" U.S. CONST.

amend. VI and W. VA. CONST. art. I, § 14 both confer on the
criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him. The right to
presence is a common law right which has been codified. W. VA. CODE § 62-3-2 (1977
Replacement Vol.). However, the right to presence has achieved constitutional
dimensions as a condition of Fourteenth Amendment due process "to the extent
that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by (defendant's) absence," Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1934), or, in effect, at a "critical stage." See,
e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). In West Virginia, the right to presence
has been termed a "constitutional right," State v. Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S.E.
676 (1901) and an "inalienable right." State v. Grove, 74 W. Va. 702, 82 S.E. 1019
(1914).
,1 233 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1977). For further discussion of this case see text
accompanying notes 2-12, supra. An additional holding in Boyd that will not be
discussed was that prosecutorial misconduct during trial constituted reversible
error.
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of the proceedings therein. On appeal, Boyd contended that his
right to presence was violated by absence from this hearing.
The court agreed, holding that this was a "critical stage" at
which defendant's presence was required and that defendant's
right to confrontation was violated." In doing so, the court engaged
in what most fittingly could be characterized as "housecleaning."
In State ex rel. Grob v. Blair,7" an in camera meeting to determine whether the chief witness in the murder trial wished to recant
her testimony was held to be a critical stage at which defendant
had a right to be present, and further that his absence constituted
a denial of his constitutional right to confront an accuser. 9 In
addition, the court held for the first time that these rights were
subject to a harmless error rule."0 The test was initially stated as
"whether the apparent error did not, beyond a reasonable doubt,
prejudice the accused at trial." 8' But later in the opinion the test
was formulated, and appeared in syllabus point eight, as "an
accused . . .must demonstrate a possibility of prejudice in the
occurrence." 2
The inconsistency was recognized in Boyd and remedied by
the holding that "where the State defends against a claim that a
right guaranteed by our Constitution has been violated, on the
basis that the violation is harmless error, it is incumbent on the
State to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."83 Thus, a defendant on appeal or a habeas corpus petitioner need only show the bare fact of violation. If the State claims
harmless error, they also have the burden of proving this beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The other "housecleaning" the court undertook also involved
Grob. In Grob it was stated that "we will now accord the right [of
presence] to the accused at any 'critical stage in the criminal
proceeding.' "" However, the principle was embodied in syllabus
" Id. at 719.
78 214 S.E.2d 330 (W. Va. 1975).
71Id. at 338-39, citing W. VA. CONsT. art.

III, § 14.
.z214 S.E.2d at 337.
Id. at 337, citing State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).
214 S.E.2d at 337, citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) and Fahy
v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963). The court also disapproved a line of West
Virginia cases holding that prejudice was not a necessary element for reversal where
defendant was absent. 214 S.E.2d at 337.
233 S.E.2d at 718.
'
214 S.E.2d at 338.
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point eight as any "critical stage in the trial proceeding."85 To clear
up any ambiguity, the McA boy court reaffirmed as the "true" rule
that the right of an accused to be present follows any critical stage
in the criminal proceeding."
A test for a "critical stage" was fashioned as "one where the
defendant's right to a fair trial will be affected. 87 To a claim of
violation of the right to presence, the State was given two defenses:
that the absence occurred at a noncritical stage, or that, even if at
a critical stage, it was harmless error.8
In connection with the harmless error rule, the duty was given
the prosecution of preserving a record of such critical stages; without such a record there could be no proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error was harmless. 9
III.

MIRANDA RIGHTS; CONFESSIONS

0
the defendant, Mrs. Hamrick, age
In State v. Hamrick,"
twenty-six, was-a poor, uneducated, non-verbal, rural resident of
very limited intelligence. Having no crib, the Hamricks' baby's
bed was in a pasteboard box beside the parents' bed. Mr. and Mrs.
Hamrick had taken their child to the hospital where it was pronounced dead. The doctors, suspecting child abuse, called the police, one of whom was present at the autopsy where the cause of
death was determined as a subdural hemorrhage.

The next day, after interrogating and extracting statements
from both parents, the policemen read Mrs. Hamrick her rights
and charged her with voluntary manslaughter. She waived counsel
Id. at 332. This language also appears in syllabus points three and nine,
although not specifically recognized by the court in McAboy. But the principle
should apply equally well to these syllabi.
233 S.E.2d at 718.
Id. at 719. The court noted in dicta that, generally, all matters starting with
commencement of the trial until final judgment required the accused's presence,
which included pre-trial hearings involving substantial matters of law or the testimony of witnesses. Preliminary hearings have been held to be critical stages.
Spaulding v. Warden, 212 S.E.2d 619, 625 (W. Va. 1975). Matters that would not
constitute a critical stage were said to be entry of routine orders, filing motions or
court orders involving clerical or administrative matters, and consultation between
defense counsel, the prosecutor and the court prior to actual trial. 233 S.E.2d at
719.
, 233 S.E.2d at 719.
s Id.
236 S.E.2d 247 (W. Va. 1977).
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and admitted hitting the baby with her hand when he was crying,
and signed a confession to that effect.
Mrs. Hamrick's conviction was reversed on appeal on grounds
of improper instructions to the jury and not allowing crossexamination of the policemen as to the circumstances under which
the statements were obtained.' However, the court went further
and, although not assigned as error, noted three Miranda violations. First, Mrs. Hamrick was a suspect when she came to the
police barracks, and the Mirandarights should have been given her
before questioning." Second, the interviews at the barracks were
"custodial," which also required police to read her her rights. 3
The third objection breaks new ground in West Virginia jurisprudence. In the words of Mr. Justice Harshbarger:
Miranda started a change. We continue it, in West Virginia, by this decision in which we hold that law enforcement
authorities cannot elicit admissible statements from persons
suspected of crimes who because of mental condition cannot
knowledgeably and intelligently waive their right to counsel."
The court cited the fact that Mrs. Hamrick could not even
spell her own name correctly on the statements. Since law enforcement authority worked most efficiently among the poor, disadvantaged and ignorant, the court felt its great task was "to attempt
to guarantee that the mentally infirm who come into an adversary
situation with government, have every protection afforded them
that those of ordinary mental fortune would have."'"
Although the court may be lauded for its efforts to protect the
constitutional rights of the mentally incompetent, one can only
guess at the standards envisioned by which to gauge whether a
" Id. at 248, 249.
2

Id. at 249.

93Id.
" Id. at 250. The court cited no authority, but the holding appears not to be
entirely unique. The United States Supreme Court has long used a "totality of the
circumstances" test by which to gauge the voluntariness of confessions and consents
to searches. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). Lack of education and
low intelligence are only two of many factors to be considered. Id. at 321-22. Cf.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In this respect, the decision in
Hamrick breaks new ground by focusing on mental condition alone, instead of
considering the entire circumstances. But, other courts have reached the same
result under the totality of circumstances test. See, e.g., Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d
1142 (5th Cir. 1972).
" 236 S.E.2d at 250.
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person has mental infirmity of such degree as to fit under the
Hamrick rule. This point must be developed in later cases.
IV.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The case of Cannellas v. McKenzie"3 came before the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on a writ of habeas corpus
alleging, as grounds for relief, ineffective assistance of counsel at
both the trial stage and on the appeal of his rape conviction. The
court agreed, granted the writ, and discharged the petitioner. 7
The test applied was that adopted in State v. Thomas: 8 "the
State's obligation when an indigent is accused of a crime is to
provide counsel who will conduct himself in such a way that he
exhibits 'the normal and customary degree of skill possessed by
attorneys who are reasonably knowledgeable of criminal
law. . . .' "'The issue was somewhat confused when language peculiar to
the "sham and mockery" test of ineffective assistance was used in
"I although this test had seemState ex rel. Wine v. Bordenkircher,
ingly been rejected in Thomas."I Cannellassettles the test as being
0 2
the "normal and customary degree of skill" test.
The important point of the case is that no single instance of
ineffectiveness was discovered which would have entitled petitioner to relief, but, taken together, petitioner did not have a fair
trial overall." 3 Since there was a "substantial probability of actual
11236

S.E.2d 327 (W. Va. 1977).
17Id. at 329, 332. The right to effective assistance of counsel arises under U.S.
CONST. amends. VI and XIV and W. VA. CONST. art. II § 14. See State v. Thomas,
203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1975).
203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1975).
" 236 S.E.2d at 331.
10 230 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1976). The "sham and mockery" test is that a conviction will not be voided on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the
attorney's efforts were so inadequate as to render the trial a farce and a mockery of
justice. Id. at 750. This test is much more lenient than that adopted in Thomas.
M01
203 S.E.2d at 458-61.
02 The "normal and customary degree of skill" test has also been applied in
Carter v. Bordenkircher, 226 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 1976).
' 236 S.E.2d at 329. The finding of overall ineffectiveness resulted from:
a) failure to challenge the chain of custody of the single piece of corroborating evidence;
b) failure to move for a mistrial when prejudicial evidence of a proposed
lie detector test of a key witness came out at trial;
c) failure to question prospective jurors as to whether they had read
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injury" from the ineffective representation, the court discharged
the petitioner from custody. ' "
An interesting point worth noting is the court's virtual invitation to reconsider the law in West Virginia as it relates to rape
corroboration requirements. It was pointed out that the sufficiency
of uncorroborated testimony for conviction in a rape trial was a
hotly debated issue and had not been considered in West Virginia
since 1944.105
V.

RIGHT TO APPEAL; HABEAS CORPUS

Where the State has failed to provide the assistance necessary
to allow a defendant to prosecute an appeal, a habeas corpus petitioner is at least entitled to resentencing and another appeal period.' ° But in certain circumstances resentencing may be an inadequate remedy and the appropriate remedy may be discharge.' 7
Actual injury and extraordinary dereliction on the part of the
State were found in Johnson v. McKenzie.'°" In that case, the
habeas corpus petitioner had been found guilty of second degree
murder and sentenced to five-to-eighteen years. A notice of intention to appeal was filed, but the State failed to provide a record of
the trial proceedings before the eight-month appeal period lapsed.
A writ of habeas corpus was granted and petitioner resentenced,
but the second appeal period expired when the State again neglected to prepare a record, and a second writ of habeas corpus was
filed.
The court held that allowing two appeal periods to expire
without providing a record to enable petitioner to appeal was extraordinary dereliction on the part of the State. 09 Furthermore, the
prejudicial newspaper articles; and
d) introduction of petitioner's marital status since it would be reversible
error for the prosecution to introduce this evidence in a rape prosecution.
Id. at 330-31.
' Id. at 332.
Id. at 331, citing State v. Beacraft, 126 W. Va. 895, 30 S.E.2d 541 (1944).
The court intimated that guidelines may be established and cited several articles
and cases.
10 State ex rel. Bradley v. Johnson, 152 W. Va. 655, 166 S.E.2d 137 (1969).
" Carter v. Bordenkircher, 226 S.E.2d 711, 716 (W. Va. 1976). Impossibility
of obtaining a transcript was specifically mentioned in footnote 2, citing Shiflett v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 433 F.2d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 1970).
,04
235 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 1977).
Id. at 139.
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injury from this dereliction of duty was actual, because petitioner
would have served the minimum sentence and thus be eligible for
parole before an appeal could be made.' The appropriate remedy
under these circumstances was unconditional discharge from custody; resentencing would simply be insufficient."'
As noted, actual injury was found in Johnson; but, if the rationale of Carterv. Bordenkircher' is adhered to, a petitioner need
only show a probability of actual injury along with extraordinary
dereliction in order to be entitled to discharge."'
Smoot v. Dingess"4 also dealt with the right to appeal. The
habeas corpus petitioner was incarcerated for civil contempt for
failure to pay alimony to his former wife. At the hearing, none of
the witnesses were placed under oath, nor was a transcript made
of the proceedings.
Stating that an adequate record was one of the fundamental
elements of due process, the court held that whenever a person
faces a possible loss of liberty, except for contempt committed in
the presence of the court, a court reporter must be available and a
stenographic record of the proceedings made."' Only when this is
done can an effective appeal be taken.

VII.

PAROLE INSTRUCTION

An issue of first impression in West Virginia arose in State v.
Lindsey."' The jury, after retiring to find a verdict in a murder
trial, returned to the courtroom and asked the trial judge certain
questions concerning the defendant's right to parole under the
permissible verdicts. The judge at one point stated that, if defendant was found guilty and marcy recommended, he would be
entitled to parole; at another point he stated that the accused
would be subject to parole under the same verdict. This exchange
was assigned as error on appeal after a verdict of guilty with no
recommendation of mercy was returned.
110Id.
"'

Id.

112226 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 1976).
"= Id. at 716.
'" 236 S.E.2d 468 (W. Va. 1977).
"'

Id. at 472.

118233 S.E.2d 734 (W. Va. 1977).
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After a consideration of the case law from other jurisdictions,
it was held that the instruction was erroneous, since the defendant
would not be entitled to parole, but only eligible for parole after
serving a minimum of ten years in prison. A reversal of the conviction was required as there was no way of knowing the prejudicial7
effect on the jury of the misleading and inaccurate instruction.1
The court did not stop here but also held that the trial court
must, without request, instruct the jury that under a verdict of
first degree murder, it may add a recommendation of mercy. The
trial court must further explain that such a recommendation
would mean the defendant could be eligible for parole consideration only after having served a minimum of ten years; otherwise,
the defendant would be confined in the penitentiary for life without possibility of parole."' However, the jury was not to concern
itself with parole matters in deciding the question of guilt or inno9
cence.

1

This decision places West Virginia in accord with a minority
of jurisdictions adhering to the rule that the jury should be informed of parole possibilities. Although the case law from other
states was considered on the effect of an erroneous parole instruction, the court did not discuss the issue of whether the jury should
be informed at all about parole-it was simply held that they
should be informed.
This is unfortunate in light of the split of authority that exists.
There are mainly two arguments militating against informing the
jury: (1) compromise verdict, and (2) separation of powers.'20 The
compromise verdict argument is that the jury will resolve doubtful
cases in favor of conviction, thus frustrating the reasonable doubt
requirement, if knowledge of parole is interjected.'"' The separation of powers argument is that parole is a matter for the executive
branch and should not be usurped by the judicial branch and
further, parole laws may change from week-to-week.'
One of the arguments for instructing the jury on parole mat,, Id. at 739; W.

VA. CODE

§§ 62-3-15, 62-12-13 (1977 Replacement Vol.).

,, 233 S.E.2d at 739.
I!d.

F. DunrL, Jury Considerationof Parole, 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 308, 311, 313
(1969) (hereinafter cited as Dutile).
"I'See, e.g., Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied
338 U.S. 834 (1949).
"I See, e.g., State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 142 A.2d 65 (1958).
'
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ters is that, in reality, matters of parole, pardon, etc. are generally
of common knowledge, and the jury should at least be apprised of
the correct law since it is evident that parole is considered in the
jury room. This argument is strongest where the jury is responsible
for sentencing. ' Secondly, even if the jury does desire to frustrate
the parole system, there is no way of preventing it; the best that
can be hoped for is to make sure this is not done on an erroneous
assumption of law.'24
In West Virginia a jury is presumed not to know the law. 25 In
a murder trial the jury is also responsible for setting the punishment by its decision as to whether or not to recommend mercy. 2 '
Undoubtedly, juries do consider the possibility of parole. On this
basis, Lindsey may have reached the correct result for murder
trials. The rationale is likely to be extended to other crimes involving a life sentence, for example, kidnapping.ln However, where the
jury has no part in the sentencing or penalty, the reasoning fails
and the proper course would appear to be to avoid mention of
parole altogether, or, upon questioning, to instruct the jury that
their duty is to determine guilt or innocence without regard to
parole.
VIII.

CRIMINAL PRESUMPTIONS

The recent trend begun in Pinkertonv. Farr'2 of striking down
statutes or instructions because they created unconstitutional pre-2
sumptions of guilt was continued in State ex rel. Cogar v. Kidd.' 1
In Kidd, the embezzlement statute 3 ' was held to violate due pro"' Note, Jury Discussionof Parole:A Time for Change, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 674,
677-82.
,24Dutile, supra note 86, at 321.
'= State v. Loveless, 139 W. Va. 454, 469, 80 S.E.2d 442, 450 (1954).
12 W. VA. CODE § 62-3-15 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
" See W. VA. CODE § 61-2-14a (1977 Replacement Vol.).
12 220 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 1975) (conspiracy statute held to create unconstitutional presumption of guilt). See also, State v. Pendry, 227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va.
1976) (instruction on murder created unconstitutional presumption of guilt).
M 234 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 1977).
'' W. VA. CODE § 61-3-20 (1977 Replacement Vol.) states in part that:
In the prosecution of any such [government servant or official] charged
with such embezzlement, fraudulent conversion or larceny, if it appear
that . . . such (government servant or official) has failed or refused to
restore or account for such [money or property] within thirty days after
proper demand has been made therefore, such [government servant or
official] shall be presumed to be guilty of such offense; but the accused
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cess by removing defendant's presumption of innocence and his
constitutional right to remain silent.'' The presumption of guilt
which came from a failure to return the property within thirty days
was a decision only the jury could properly make. By shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant of proving the opposite, the preand the right to remain silent were effecsumption of innocence
3 2
tively thwarted.
The second presumption, creating prima facie appropriation
by failure to account or pay over, was also found objectionable.
Appropriation was an essential element of the crime, and the State
was not entitled to any presumption or inference to avoid proof of
an element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.1n
The entire statute was not rendered void, but only those parts
which created the presumptions. Prosecutions may34continue without benefit of the unconstitutional presumptions.
IX.

ROBBERY; DOUBLE JEOPARDY

In State v. Cunningham"r the defendant was indicted for robbery.' 3 ' The indictment read in relevant part: "Cunningham...
in and upon one Orval Hoover an assault did feloniously make, and
• . .put in bodily fear." At his trial, defendant was found guilty
may rebut such presumption by disproving any such facts.
... .The failure of any such [government servant or official] to account for or pay over, as required by law, any such [money or property]
shall be prima facie evidence that he has so appropriated or used the
same for his own benefit or for the benefit of such other person.
"1 234 S.E.2d at 901.
132Id.
13 Id.
at 902.
' Id.
" 236 S.E.2d 459 (W. Va. 1977).
" W. VA. CODE § 61-2-12 (1977 Replacement Vol.) reads as follows:
If any person commit, or attempt to commit, robbery by partial strangulation or suffocation, or by striking or beating, or by other violence to the
person, or by threat or presenting of firearms, or other deadly weapon or
instrumentality whatsoever, he shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon
conviction, shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than ten years.
If any person commit or attempt to commit, a robbery in any other mode
or by any other means, except as provided for in the succeeding paragraph of this section, he shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction,
shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than five nor more than
eighteen years.
Although not truly descriptive, "armed robbery" refers to the first sentence of
the robbery statute, and "unarmed robbery" refers to the second sentence.
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of armed robbery. A new trial was granted on defendant's second
motion for a new trial, but the prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi,
and subsequently obtained another indictment which read in relevant part: "Cunningham. . . in and upon one Orval Hoover an
assault did feloniously make, and him the said Orval Hoover, unlawfully did strike, beat and do violence to his person, and...
feloniously put in bodily fear. . . ." On this indictment, the defendant pleaded guilty to "unarmed robbery" and appealed.
The defendant contended that the first indictment was for
unarmed robbery, and that the second indictment on armed robbery was therefore barred by double jeopardy"7 and due process,",
and that dismissal of the first indictment by the nolle prosequi
without notice to the defendant or opportunity to be heard also
violated due process.
The court did not agree with any of these contentions. The
decision of whether or not to prosecute was an executive decision,
and, even though its entry required court permission, defendant
had no right to a hearing.'
The court also held that the first indictment was sufficient to
charge defendant with armed robbery.' This issue was really the
crux of defendant's appeal; the finding of sufficiency was dispositive of both the double jeopardy and due process claims. The first
conviction was set aside on defendant's own motion, therefore the
State could properly try him again on the same charge."' Since the
second indictment did not charge a higher offense, there was no
denial of due process.'
Justice Miller filed a dissenting opinion which brings the importance of the case into sharp focus. He felt that the majority
opinion abolished any distinction between armed robbery and unarmed robbery.' In effect, the majority held that "assault" was
sufficient to mean "partial strangulation, striking, or beating or
other violence" within the meaning of the statute. But the word
"assault" is in itself ambiguous. At common law an assault was the
threat to do violence; a battery was the actual doing of violence to
amend. VII; W. VA. CONsT. art. H, § 10.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 10.
236 S.E.2d at 461-62.

...U.S. CONST.
'

Id. at 464.
Id. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
2 236 S.E.2d at 464. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
" 236 S.E.2d at 465.
"'
"
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the person."' The identical language of the first indictment would
just as well serve to charge unarmed robbery.' This being so, the
indictment does not plainly inform the defendant of the offense
charged, in violation of the West Virginia Constitution. '"
The other flaw in the majority opinion was in its reliance on
State ex rel. Vascovich v. Skeen 4 ' to decide the sufficiency of the
language in the first indictment. The language in that case, also
involving a charge of unarmed robbery, was pure dicta as to
whether it charged armed robbery and this was stated by the
court. 4 '
Overall, it appears that Justice Miller's dissent was well
taken. One can only hope that prosecutors will charge defendants
with the crime of armed robbery more artfully than was accomplished in Cunningham.
X.

NONSUPPORT

In State v. Clay' the defendant was convicted for nonsupport
of an illegitimate daughter. The trial court instructed the jury that
paternity need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
On appeal, defendant contended that paternity was an element of
the crime and that failure to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt
constituted a denial of due process. The court agreed and so held, 110
striking down the statute to the contrary as unconstitutional. 5 '
The obvious question raised but not answered in the opinion
is what effect a prior finding of paternity in a bastardy suit, a civil
action, 2 would have in a criminal trial. The issue was not present
in Clay, so the question remains open for later consideration.
'" State v. Hatfield, 48 W. Va. 561, 37 S.E. 626 (1900). "The definition of
assault is an unlawful attempt or offer, with force of violence, to do a bodily injury
to another. . . . An assault may be completed without touching the person of the
one assaulted ...
" Id. at 575, 37 S.E. at 631.
' 236 S.E.2d at 467.
, ' Id.; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14.
117138 W. Va. 417, 76 S.E.2d 283 (1953).

"I Id. at 421-22, 76 S.E.2d at 285-86.
,4' 236 S.E.2d 230 (W. Va. 1977).
'0 Id. at 232-33.
', W. VA. CODE § 48-8-5 (1976 Replacement Vol.) provides that: "No other or
greater evidence shall be required to prove. . . that the defendant is the father...
of such child or children, than is or shall be required to prove such facts in a civil
action. . . "
52 See W. VA. CODE § 48-7-1 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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XI.

CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELINQUENCY OF A MINOR

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals essentially rewrote the law pertaining to the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in State v. Austin.'53 In this case, the defendant
had been convicted of "contributing" for his marriage to a fifteenyear-old West Virginia girl after taking her to Maryland without
parental consent.
On appeal the conviction was reversed with a direction of
acquittal.' 4 The court held that a law or ordinance that carried no
criminal penalty, or which carried only a nominal fine, could not
be the foundation for a contributing charge: the "inconsequentialness of the punishment" was said to compel the conclusion
that society intended no serious criminal punishment to flow from
violation of such laws.' 5 Since the statute forbidding marriage to
minors without parental consent carried no penalty,'5 ' the legislature could not have intended that it be the basis of a contributing
charge.'57
Another important aspect of the case was the resolution of two
conflicting cases'5 ' as to whether criminal intent was a necessary
element of the crime. The court held that the prosecution was
required to prove that the defendant knowingly committed the
acts complained of.'59
The statute defining a delinquent child has been amended
since its consideration in Austin."' This is important in that this

statute must be read in pari materiawith the "contributing" statute to ascertain the elements of contributing to the delinquency of
a minor."' However, it is doubtful that the basic holding in Austin
will be affected by this amendment.
234 S.E.2d 657 (W. Va. 1977).
Id. at 664.
' Id. at 661.
' See W. VA. CODE §§ 48-1-1, -8 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
234 S.E.2d at 661-62.
's' State v. Harris, 105 W. Va. 165, 141 S.E. 637 (1928) (criminal intent not a
necessary element of proof); and State v. Westfall, 126 W. Va. 476, 29 S.E.2d 6
(1944) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt of knowingly contributing required).
'' 234 S.E.2d at 660.
"' See W. VA. CODE § 49-1-4 (Cum. Supp. 1977) and note 137 infra.
"6 234 S.E.2d at 659.
'5'
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STATUTES

The West Virginia Legislature acted extensively in the criminal law area in 1977. Important statutes were passed in the areas
of child welfare, prisoner's rights, worthless checks and court appointment of counsel for indigents.
A.

Child Welfare

One of the most comprehensive pieces of legislation was the
amendment of the Child Welfare Act.' 2 "Child,""' "delinquent
child""' and "neglected child""' 5 were redefined and a new category, that of "abused child,""' was added. In addition, important
procedural and substantive changes were made with regard to each
of these categories.
A comprehensive procedural framework was established to
afford juveniles the full trial rights accorded adults. The most
outstanding provisions guarantee children the right to retained or
appointed counsel at all stages of the proceedings, a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, to testify and cross-examine witnesses
and all other protections guaranteed by article III of the West
Virginia Constitution."' Both the procedural rights afforded adults
in criminal proceedings and the rules of evidence were made applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings."'
The legislature also evinces a purpose to preclude detention of
juveniles in all but the most demanding circumstances in order to
provide maximum protection from adulterating influences and to
ensure that the least restrictive punishment advisable under the
circumstances be imposed. In this respect, the major provisions
include:
(a) a child taken into custody must be released on recognizance unless there is reasonable cause to believe that the child
"6

W. VA. CODE

§§

49-1-1 to -5, 49-5-1 to -17, 49-6-1 to -10, 49-6A-10 (Cum.

Supp. 1977).
"3 Id. § 49-1-2.
"3 Id. § 49-1-4.
"3 Id. § 49-1-3.
166An "abused child" is one whose parent or guardian attempts to, inflicts, or

allows to be inflicted, physical injury which seriously endangers the present physical or mental health of the child, or inflicts sexual abuse upon the child. Id.
",
"3

Id. § 49-5-1.
Id.
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will commit a crime involving serious injury or will be unavailable for court proceedings;' 9
(b) at a mandatory preliminary hearing, the child may be
allowed an improvement period on terms calculated to serve the
rehabilitative needs of the child if the court feels this will serve
the best interests of the child;7 0
(c) jurisdiction may be transferred to a criminal proceeding
for violent crimes or crimes involving substantial danger to the
public when the child is sixteen years or older and there is no
reasonable prospect of rehabilitation. Provision is made for an
interlocutory appeal;"'
power to order psychological examina(d) the court is given
7 2
tion of the child;'
(e) the court must make the least restrictive disposition of the
73
case;
(f) strict rules are provided for detaining children in jail and
at no time can a child be housed with adults who have committed crimes;' 7 and
(g) strict rules are provided for governance of all juvenile
correctional facilities.7 5
In conjunction with these provisions, one of the most revolutionary sections mandates that, in January of each year, the court
must order the destruction of all law enforcement, court and private agency files and records regarding every person over whom
juvenile jurisdiction has terminated. No individual, firm, corporation or other entity may discriminate in any manner against a
person because of involvement in a juvenile proceeding; simply
stated, a juvenile proceeding is deemed never to have occurred. 176
The trend, noted above, of affording children full constitutional and procedural rights is carried over to proceedings concerning neglected or abused children. One major change provides that
both the
under no circumstances may the same attorney represent
77
child and the parents or guardian in such proceedings.
Also noteworthy are the provisions for taking a child from the
custody of the parents. A child may be transferred to the tempoId. § 49-5-8(d).
1"0
Id. § 49-5-9.
"' Id. § 49-5-10.
1"2Id. § 49-5-13.
73 Id.
'VI Id. § 49-5-16(a).
I's
Id. § 49-5-16(b).
"7' Id. § 49-6-2.
"'

17 Id.
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rary custody of the state department or a responsible relative only
if the court finds imminent danger to the physical well-being of the
child or the existence of no reasonably available alternatives to
removal.'78 Parental custody rights cannot be terminated unless
there is "no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or
abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future."' 7
Perhaps the most controversial section requires medical professionals, Christian Science practitioners, law enforcement officials and social workers, among others, to report suspected cases
of child abuse or neglect under penalty of law.' 0 Communications
privileges between husband and wife or between any professional
person and patient or client (with the exception of the attorneyclient privilege) are removed, and civil or criminal liability is absolved for good faith reporting.''
B.

Prisoner'sRights

The legislature also took a significant step in the area of prisoner's rights and prison reform. Espousing an intention of humanely and justly reestablishing the ability of persons committed
to institutions to return and live peaceably in the community at
the earliest possible time,' 2 a Department of Corrections was created for the sole purpose of governing penal and correctional facilities." 3
Although the commissioner and the wardens were generally
given complete authority over management of the institutions,' 4
this power was somewhat restricted with codification of certain
prisoner's rights. Among the most important are:
(a) an eight-hour work day with a one-hour lunch period;
(b) a mandatory physical examination and work assignment
such as the prisoner's physical health and strength reasonably
permits;
Id. § 49-6-3.
r'
Id. § 49-6-5(b).
11 Id. § 49-6A-2. The full list of those required to report include: "[any
medical, dental, or mental health professional, christian science practitioner, religious healer, school teacher or other school personnel, social service worker, child
care or foster care worker, peace officer or law enforcement official."
"' Id. §§ 49-6A-6,-7.
, 2 W. VA. CODE § 62-13-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
' W. VA. CODE § 25-1-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
'" See generally, W. VA. CODE § 62-13-4 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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(c) commutation of sentence for work in excess of eight hours
per day "necessary and essential to efficient organization of
convict forces";
(d) relaxation of strict prison rules and extension of social
privileges or commutation of sentence on the basis of merit for
good conduct; and
(e) opportunity for hearing before any privileges conferred are
revoked."'
All privileges or commutations of sentence may be revoked for
violation of rules known to the prisoner.'86
C.

Worthless Checks

The law pertaining to issuance of worthless checks was also
revamped during the last legislative session. A distinction is made
between obtaining money, services, goods or other property by
means of a worthless check or its equivalent,8 1 and the making or
delivering of a worthless check or its equivalent for the payment
of money upon a bank or depository.'m
Where the person (including a firm or corporation) obtains
property by means of a worthless check, he must "know" at the
time that there are insufficient funds to pay the same upon presentation." 9 Payment of the dishonored check is no defense or grounds
for dismissal,' but if the payee had reasonable grounds to believe
there were insufficient funds, or the check was post-dated, the
section is inapplicable.' Conviction under the statute is a felony
if the check is in an amount greater than two hundred dollars
92
($200); otherwise it is a misdemeanor.
A person, issuing or drawing a check or its equivalent upon a
bank, who knows or has reason to know that there are not sufficient
funds on deposit to cover the same is guilty of a misdemeanor.'93
Here, payment of the check and authorized costs is a defense or
W. VA. CODE §§ 28-5-27, -28 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
In Id. But, if an escaped prisoner voluntarily returns without expense to the
State, no forfeiture shall be made. Id. § 28-5-28.
,, W. VA. CODE § 61-3-39 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Id. § 61-3-39a.
"

,' Id. § 61-3-39.
" Id. § 61-3-39b.
"' Id. § 61-3-39.
192Id.

"I Id. § 61-3-39a.
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grounds for dismissal.'94 Again, the section is inapplicable if the
payee had knowledge or reason to believe that the check would be
dishonored, or if the check is post-dated.' 5
Providing false information prior to acceptance of the check
or in order to obtain check cashing privileges is also made a misdemeanor.'96
The holder of a worthless check has two options: he may notify
the maker and impose a five dollar ($5.00) service charge,' 97 or file
a complaint with a magistrate in a county wherein venue lies.'99
These remedies are exclusive; he cannot impose the service charge
if a complaint is filed. If the holder opts for the notice and service
charge, the statute authorizes one notice per a form provided, but
no other written or oral threats of prosecution may be made to
enhance collection of the check.'99
If a complaint is filed, statutory notice is given by the magistrate to the maker, but no warrant for arrest may issue unless the
check and court costs are not paid within twenty (20) days or the
2
maker is about to flee the jurisdiction. 0
D.

Appointment Of Counsel For Indigents

29
Pursuant to the decision in State ex rel. Partainv. Oakley '
the Legislature passed a new law relating to appointment of counsel for indigents in criminal cases.2 2 Under the new system, any
person, juvenile or adult, accused of a crime involving a possibility
of confinement or a fine of more than five hundred dollars ($500.00)
is entitled to court-appointed counsel, investigative services, and
other necessary services at all stages of the proceedings, including

,, Id.
Id.
Id.
,,Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 61-3-39b.
§ 61-3-39a.
§ 61-3-39d(c).
§ 61-3-39e.
§ 61-3-39f.
§ 61-3-39e.

Id. § 61-3-39g.
' 227 S.E.2d 314 (W. Va. 1976). This case stated that a large number of

criminal appointments to a particular lawyer could reach such a level as to constitute a taking of property without due process of law. The statutory scheme for
appointing counsel was stated to be inadequate; but, rather than acting immediately, the court gave the legislature until July 1, 1977, to act before exercising their
supervisory powers over the bar to correct the system. Id. at 314, 323. See Survey,
Developments of the Law in West Virginia, 79 W. VA. L. REV. 445 (1977).
2 W. VA. CODE §§ 51-11-1 to -9 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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03
The circuit court or magistrate is under
sentencing and appeal.1
a duty to inform the accused of his right to an attorney and investigative and other services."' One of the more interesting provisions
is that the circuit court shall appoint one or more counsel, at least
one of whom shall be reasonably competent in the practice of criminal law.2" 5

The court, in deciding whether a person is needy, must consider such factors as net worth, liquidity of assets, disposable income, the number and ages of dependents and other material factors; the fact of release on bond cannot be determinative." 6 The
furnishing of false information by either the accused or an attorney
2
is a misdeameanor. 0
The legislature has thus attempted to prevent the criminal
appointment system from becoming unconstitutional. Although
the hourly rates of compensation are the same as those under the
old statute, appointed att 6rneys are now relieved of the burden of
paying any necessary investigative or other services required by the
case.
- Id. §§ 51-11-2, -3. This right extends to juvenile proceedings. Id. § 50-4-3,
post-conviction habeas corpus, Id. § 53-4A-4, and parole violation hearings, Id. §

62-12-22, as well as in the circuit court. Id. § 62-3-1.
Id. § 51-11-4.
Id. § 51-11-5.
' Id. § 51-11-6.
217

Id. §§ 51-11-6, -7.
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8
At issue in Petition for Change of Name of Harris" was "the
right of a divorced woman with minor children to change her name
and the right of the guardian of a minor child to have the child's
name changed." ' 9 A divorced woman petitioned the circuit court
to have her maiden name restored and to have the name of her
minor son changed. Although notice of the proposed name changes
was published in a newspaper of general circulation in compliance
requirements, the circuit court denied both petiwith statutory
2 0
tions. '

Considering the right of the divorced woman to have her name
changed, the court recognized that a court granting a divorce is
authorized to restore to a woman her former or maiden name only
where the woman has no living children.22 ' The court noted, however, that the general statute regarding change of name2 2 permits
any person to change his or her name upon fulfilling the statutory
requirements.2 1 In concluding that a divorced woman has a right
to have her name changed regardless of the fact that she has living
children, the court said, "W. Va. Code, 48-5-1 [1969] does not
exclude a divorced wife with living children from its provisions,
and accordingly. . . any woman who has been divorced, notwithstanding the fact that she has living children by that marriage,
may petition either to have her maiden name restored or to change
her name to some other name . . ., and she has an absolute right
to such change if there are otherwise no impediments under W. Va.
Code, 48-5-3 [1969], notwithstanding Code, 48-2-23 [1969].121
In dealing with the right of the divorced woman to have her
child's name changed, the court announced two underlying considerations which should guide a judge in considering a petition for
the change of name of a minor child-the interest of the child's
236 S.E.2d 426 (W. Va. 1977).
IId. at 427.
_-,"In the case of Mrs. Harris, the circuit court denied the petition on the
grounds that the court granting her divorce had declined to restore her maiden
name because she had a minor child, and in the case of the child,. . . the court
denied the petition on the grounds that to grant the name change the court would,
'in effect bastardize this child.' " Id.
2,,W. VA. CODE § 48-2-23 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
.2 W. VA. CODE § 48-5-1 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
2 3 W. VA. CODE § 48-5-3 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
22 236 S.E.2d at 428.
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father and the best interests of the child. 2 5 The court found that a
father has a protectible interest in having his child bear his name,
although that interest is not so great that it cannot be taken away
where the best interests of the child would be served by changing
the child's name. 26 Nevertheless, the interest is such that where
the child's father is living, actual notice must be given to the father
before the petition for change of name may be heard if the father's
whereabouts are known or could be determined with reasonable
diligence. 27 However, the interest of the father in having his child
bear his name is made to depend on the extent to which the father
exercises his parental rights and obligations. Where the father,
living or dead, has exercised his parental rights and performed his
parental duties, the court holds that "the name of the child should
not be changed absent a showing by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that such change will significantly advance the best interests of the child. ' 21 8 On the other hand, where the father has abandoned the child, and has not undertaken to exercise the authority
and responsibilities of a parent, the court would allow the mother
or guardian to change the child's name upon proper notice to the
father, the father having waived his 19interest in having his child
2
bear his name by the abandonment.
In Murredu v. Murredu,2 10 the Supreme Court of Appeals dealt
with the corroboration requirement in divorce cases as applied to
a claim for divorce asserting a separation for the statutory period,
a divorce court's authority to award to one party exclusive possession of jointly owned real property and individually owned personal property incident to a child custody award, and the amendment of claims for divorce asserting new grounds therefor.
Initially, the court ruled that corroborative testimony was required by statute to authorize a divorce court to grant a divorce
grounded on a separation of the parties for the statutory period of
time.2 2 ' The court noted that by statute, no divorce could be
215

236 S.E.2d at 428-29.

2I Id. at 429.

Id. at 428.
Id.
211 Id. at 430. The court points out that the abandonment contemplated by
their formulation is that required to divest a father of his parental rights under the
adoption statute, W. VA. CODE § 48-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The court requires such
proof of abandonment in order to insure that the change of name statute is not used
to circumvent the adoption statute by divesting a father of his parental appearance.
217
21'

20

236 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va. 1977).

21

Id. at 455. W. VA.

CODE

§ 48-2-4(a)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977) amended the prior
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granted on the uncorroborated testimony of the parties.22 Reasoning from the recently enacted irreconcilable differences ground for
divorce, which by express provision makes corroborative testimony
unnecessary,2 3 the court found that where the legislature intended
corroboration to be unnecessary it expressly permitted the courts
to grant a divorce on the uncorroborated testimony of the parties.
Since the Legislature had made no such exception with regard to
the separation statute, the court concluded that corroborative testimony was required before a divorce court could decree a divorce
on such ground.
The court next dealt with the divorce court's disposition of the
real and personal property of the parties. The divorce decree in the
instant case granted a divorce to the husband, awarded him custody of the couple's three minor children, granted him the right to
live in the home property until the youngest child reached eighteen, and awarded him possession of the household furnishings. The
wife contended that the divorce court had no jurisdiction to award
the husband exclusive possession of the jointly owned real property, nor to award him posession of all the household furnishings.
In considering a divorce court's authority to award exclusive
possession of jointly owned real property, the court noted that
although one previous decision indicated a court had jurisdiction
to make such an award incident to an award of alimony, child
custody and maintenance,24 subsequent decisions had expressly
left unresolved the issue of whether the West Virginia statute governing alimony and child custody and maintenance 22 authorized
Code provision by reducing the statutory period required for living separate and
apart from two years to one year.
22W. VA. CODE § 48-2-19 (1976 Replacement Vol.) provides in part that: "no
judgment order shall be granted on the uncorroborated testimony of the parties or
either of them."
2 W. VA. CODE § 48-2-4(a)(10) (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides that: "In such case
no corroboration of the grounds for divorce shall be required."
22 Kinsey v. Kinsey, 143 W. Va. 574, 103 S.E.2d 409 (1958).
22' W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1976 Replacement Vol.). The language of the statute
relevant to the issue at hand is:
For the purpose of making effectual any order provided for in this section
the court may make any order concerning the estate of the parties, or
either of them, as it shall deem expedient.
It is interesting to note that W. VA. CODE § 48-2-13 (Cum. Supp. 1977), dealing
with the maintenance of spouse and children pendente lite, expressly authorizes the
court "to grant exclusive use and occupancy of the marital home to one of the
parties during the pendency of the action."
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an award of exclusive possession. 22' In the instant case the court
settled the issue, holding that "the court did have jurisdiction
under W. VA. CODE, 48-2-15, to decree the exclusive possession of
the home property to the spouse who was awarded custody of the
children."11
The court then considered the trial court's award of all the
furnishings to the husband. West Virginia Code, § 48-2-21, permits
a party to a divorce to petition the court for a return of his property
which is in the control of the other party.12 Prior case law in West
Virginia established that, in a divorce action, a court is authorized
to award ownership of personal property under section 48-2-21 only
upon a specific request for possession of enumerated items. 29 As
no specific request for possession had been made in the instant
action with regard to the household furnishings, the court held that
"the trial court erred in awarding all of the household furnishings
to the husband, [and] on remand the wife will be entitled to
petition the trial court for her personal property which is in the
possession of the husband." '' However, the court noted that the
right of a party to regain possession of his or her personal property
by resort to section 48-2-21 was limited by the statutory ability of
the court to make any award concerning the property of either
party as an incident to making effectual a decree of alimony, custody and maintenance of children.
Additionally, the court dealt with the amendment of a claim
for divorce to assert a new ground for divorce. The husband in
Murredu had amended his counterclaim to the wife's original complaint for divorce to assert as grounds for divorce the two-year
separation statute. The trial court awarded the husband a divorce
based on that ground. The Supreme Court of Appeals, distinguishing instances where the evidence used to prove the original ground
for divorce was obtained after the institution of the action 23' from
cases where a new claim for divorce is asserted on grounds arising
after the institution of the initial action, held that the husband's
2" State ex rel. Collins v. Muntzing, 151 W. Va. 843, 157 S.E.2d 16 (1967);
State ex rel. Hammond v. Worrell, 144 W. Va. 83, 106 S.E.2d 521 (1958).
236 S.E.2d at 457.
W. VA. CoDE § 48-2-21 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
Wood v. Wood, 126 W. Va. 189, 28 S.E.2d 423 (1943).
n' 236 S.E.2d at 457.
21 Brown v. Brown, 142 W. Va. 695, 97 S.E.2d 811 (1957).
"
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amendment to his counterclaim asserting the two-year separation
statute was permissible under our liberal rules of pleading.23
In 1977, the West Virginia Legislature enacted several significant amendments to Chapter forty-eight, Article two of the West
Virginia Code governing divorce and support and maintenance
pendente lite.
Paragraph (a) of section four, which names and describes the
grounds for divorce in West Virginia, was amended to reduce the
statutory time period for accrual of a ground in two instances.
Amended subparagraph (a)(3) shortened the period for abandonment or desertion from one year to six months.2 3 Subparagraph
(a)(7), which makes living separate and apart a ground for divorce,
was amended to provide that the parties' separation must be continuous for only one year in lieu of the previously required two year
separation.24
Paragraph (a) of section four was also amended to add two
additional grounds for divorce. Subparagraph (a) (9) provides that
abuse or neglect of a child, as defined therein, shall be a ground
for divorce.235 The degree of proof required to sustain a divorce on
the ground of child abuse or neglect is "clear and convincing evidence" sufficient to justify depriving the offending party of his or
her right to custody. Subparagraph (a)(10) provides that a divorce
may now be granted where the parties admit by way of verified
complaint and answer that irreconcilable differences exist between
the parties.26 Significantly, no corroborative testimony is required
to prove irreconcilable differences. Additionally, the statute mandates that no divorce can be ordered on the grounds of irreconcilable differences until at least sixty (60) days have elapsed since the
date of the filing of the complaint.
Section thirteen of Article 48, Chapter two was amended2

7

to

n' 236 S.E.2d at 458-59.
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-4(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
2' W. VA. CODE § 48-2-4(a)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
"' W. VA. CODE § 48-2-4(a)(9) (Cum. Supp. 1977):
...For purposes of this subsection, "abuse" means any physical injury
including, but not limited to, sexual molestation, or mental injury inflicted on such child; and "neglect" means wilful failure to provide, by
one of the parties who is legally responsible for the care and maintenance
of a child, the proper or necessary support, education as required by law,
or medical, surgical or other care necessary for the well-being of a child.
zMW. VA. CODE § 48-2-4(a)(10) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
2" W. VA. CODE § 48-2-13 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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give a divorce court express authority to grant to one of the parties
to an action for divorce exclusive use of the marital home during
the pendency of the action. Additionally, the section now permits
a party deserted or abandoned, or where the parties are living
separate or apart, to institute an action for divorce alleging that
he or she believes the abandonment or separation will continue for
the statutory period. This permits the court to order maintenance
payments and other forms of relief prior to the accrual of a ground
for divorce. If the period of abandonment or separation does in fact
continue for the requisite period of time to constitute a ground for
divorce, the divorce action may proceed to hearing without the
filing of a new complaint so long as the opposing party is given
twenty days notice of the hearing.
Finally, Chapter forty-eight, Article two, section fourteen,
dealing with when a divorce is not permitted and setting forth
several defenses to actions for divorce, was amended to completely
eliminate collusion as a defense to a divorce action.2
The West Virginia Legislature also made several additions to
the Code sections regulating adoption and child welfare agencies
in an effort to deal with the increased recognition of the rights of
natural fathers of illegitimate children in those children.
Chapter forty-eight, Article four, section six of the West Virginia Code was amended to provide that a determined father29 of
an illegitimate child who did not consent to the adoption of that
child, a determined father of an illegitimate child entitled to notice
under § 48-4-1(b) (1) of an adoption proceeding who was not served
with notice as provided, 24 0 or a natural father of an illegitimate
child entitled to notice under § 49-3-1(b) of a proceeding by a child
welfare agency to terminate his rights who was not served with
§ 48-2-14 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
W. VA. CODE § 48-4-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides that:
As used in this article, the term "determined father" means any person
who:

2' W. VA. CODE
2"

(1) Has been found guilty under the provisions of article seven [§ 48-71 et seq.], chapter forty-eight of this Code; or
(2) Has acknowledged his parental status by contributing to the child's

support, by living with the mother, at the time of conception, or by
admitting paternity by any means.
240W. VA. CODE § 48-4-1(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977). If the father resides within
the State he must be personally served with notice, but if after due diligence
personal service cannot be obtained, or if the father lives outside the State, the
notice may be sent by registered mail to his last known address.
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notice as provided,2 4' may petition the court to vacate the adoption
"at any time within one year after learning of or having reasonable
2 2
opportunity to learn of the adoption.
Section one of Chapter forty-nine, Article three, was amended
so as to provide child welfare agencies with a method to terminate
the rights of a natural father of an illegitimate child upon grounds
of "nonsupport . . . , abandonment, desertion, or neglect... ,
or that said father is unfit to have custody" when the mother has
executed a relinquishment of the child to the agency.24 3 The statute
requires that the father be given notice of the hearing on the petition. 4 However, if actual notice cannot be given to the father, the
section permits the court to proceed with the hearing and, upon
proper proof, terminate the father's parental rights, subject to the
father's right to revocation under § 48-4-6.
2" W. VA. CODE § 49-3-1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides in part that

A copy of the petition and notice of the date, time and place of the
hearing on said petition shall be personally served on said father at least
twenty days prior to the date set for the hearing; and if after due diligence
personal service cannot be obtained, or if the father resides outside the
state, the copy of the petition and the notice of the hearing shall be sent
by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the last known address of
said father.
2'2 W. VA. CODE § 48-4-6(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
213W. VA. CODE § 49-3-1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).

Id.

244
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INSURANCE
In Broy v. Inland Mutual Insurance Co., "4 ' the issue was
whether a named insured under an automobile liability insurance
policy could maintain a direct action against her insurer on a judgment recovered against a tort-feasor who was an additional insured
under the policy's omnibus clause. The plaintiff was injured when
struck by a pickup truck owned by her husband but being driven
by another with her husband's permission. In a previous action by
the plaintiff against the driver of the vehicle, plaintiff recovered a
jury verdict in the amount of $7,000. Execution on the judgment
was returned "no property found," and plaintiff instituted the
present action to recover the judgment amount from her husband's
insurance company.
At trial, the court directed a verdict in favor of the insurance
company, ruling that the plaintiff was precluded from recovering
against the insurer on either of two theories. "First, if she was a
jointly named insured with her husband on the policy sued upon,
she was, in effect, suing herself. Secondly, if not a named insured,
the doctrine of interspousal immunity precluded her suit in that
her husband was a named insured.""24 The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "where an additional insured causes
injury to a named insured under an automobile liability policy, the
named insured may, in the absence of any exclusionary language
to the contrary, maintain a direct action against the insurance
company to recover the amount of the judgment rendered against
the additional insured." '47
The court initially noted that precedent in West Virginia allowed an injured plaintiff to maintain a direct action against the
insurer where an insured with coverage under a liability policy
233 S.E.2d 131 (W. Va. 1977).
Id. at 132. Whether or not plaintiff was a named insured under her husband's policy with the defendant was in dispute at trial. Given the alternative
reasons for the trial court's decision, the trial court apparently found resolution of
that dispute unnecessary. Likewise, as the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed as
to both theories offered by the trial court in support of the directed verdict, a
determination of whether or not plaintiff was a named insured was not essential to
245
218

its decision.
217 Id. at 133. Although the insurance policy was not introduced into evidence
at trial, neither party questioned that the policy conformed to the statutory requirement that all automobile liability policies issued in West Virginia contain an omnibus clause. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(a) (1975 Replacement Vol.).
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failed to pay a judgment entered in a personal injury action. 4 The
argument generally advanced by insurers in cases similar to the
instant case is that to allow the named insured to recover against
the insurer would transform the policy from one of indemnity to
one of personal accident insurance for the benefit of the insured. 4 '
The court reasoned, however, that the indemnity aspect of the
policy was preserved because the person required to be indemnified by the statutory omnibus clause was the additional insured.
Restating the general principle that insurance contracts are to be
strictly construed against the insurer, 5 ' the court said that in the
absence of language in the policy excluding a named insured from
recovering for personal injuries, such an exclusion should not be
implied.'
In rejecting the argument that the doctrine of interspousal
immunity precluded the plaintiff from maintaining the present
action, the court noted that generally the doctrine was applicable
only when the suit was between husband and wife. 22 Here, however, the plaintiff was not suing her husband to recover for the
injuries she sustained. The plaintiff sought to enforce the additional insured's contractual right to indemnity from the insurer as
provided in the statutorily required omnibus clause. The additional insured's contractual right to indemnity coverage, and the
plaintiff's consequent right to enforce the indemnity coverage,
were found to be independent of plaintiffs relationship with her
husband, and the court refused to extend application of the interspousal immunity doctring to the instant case.
Despite holding that a named insured under an automobile
liability insurance policy may maintain an action against his insurer for injuries caused by an additional insured under the policy,
the court limited its holding to instances where the policy contains
no language excluding the named insured from coverage. Courts
which have previously considered such exclusionary clauses have
generally held them to be valid in the absence of any statutory
prohibition .- 3 Whether the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap233 S.E.2d at 132.
Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 711 (1967).
?50233 S.E.2d at 133.
'

I2
Id.
21 Id. at 134.

Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1061 (1972). See, e.g., Jenkins v. Morano, 74 F. Supp.
234 (E.D. Va. 1947), applying Virginia law and upholding a clause excluding named
insureds from coverage.
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157

peals will find that West Virginia statutory law authorizes the use
of clauses excluding named insureds from coverage when injured
by an additional insured remains for future consideration.
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT
In State ex rel. Piccirillo v. City of Follansbee,54 petitioner
challenged a provision of the Charter of Follansbee which required
a candidate for council to have paid taxes on at least one hundred
dollars ($100.00) worth of real or personal property in the city,
contending that the property restriction violated her constitutional
right of equal protection. Since the West Virginia Code contains a
similar property ownership requirement for municipal office holders,15 the issue presented was whether the State or a municipality
may require a city council candidate to possess assessed property.
The noteworthy aspect of this case is that it marks the first
time this clause of the West Virginia Constitution"' has been used
to challenge the validity of property-holding requirements for candidates for municipal public office. Therefore, the task before the
court was to apply that clause to a new factual situation and formulate standards to determine when it has been violated.
The case closest to the one at hand is a United States Supreme
Court decision, Turner v. Fouche,17 in which a Georgia statute
requiring a candidate for a local board of education to be a freeholder, was held to violate the Equal Protection Clause. In that
case, the court used two tests to determine whether a state classification violates the equal protection guarantee. These two federal
standards were adopted by the West Virginia Supreme Court in
applying the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution
in Cimino v. Board of Education."' One is the traditional standard, requiring that the state classification bear some "rational
relationship" to the achievement of a legitimate state purpose. The
other is a more demanding test, to be used on statutes and classifications which impinge on sensitive and fundamental rights and
constitutional freedoms, such as religion and speech. In order to
uphold these statutes a court must find that a "compelling" state
interest is served.
The court chose to adopt these federal standards in applying
the state clause. The next step was deciding which standard to
- 233 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1977).
W. VA. CODE § 8-5-7(c) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
2" W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17.
- 396 U.S. 346, (1970). The Court held in Turner that Georgia's freeholder
requirement was unconstitutional.
- 210 S.E.2d 485 (W. Va. 1974).
2"
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apply, or more specifically, whether being a council candidate is a
fundamental right requiring the more demanding compelling interest test. The court in Brewer v. Wilson 9 specifically recognized
that the right to become a candidate for election to public office is
a valuable and a fundamental right. In that case, no equal protection argument was advanced and the court upheld qualifications
for candidates imposed by the Legislature. In State ex rel. Maloney
v. McCartney,"'0 the right to be a candidate was recognized as
fundamental and entitled to constitutional protection under the
Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment concepts of freedom of association and expression. In that case, a sufficiently compelling state interest was found to sustain the Governor's Succession Amendment. However, the court found that the property
qualifications imposed in the Follansbee Charter and the West
Virginia Code served no compelling interest of the state since it
had little possible, benefit and could possibly lead to "insidious
consequences.""6 ' Therefore, the property restrictions for becoming
a candidate violated one's right of equal protection as guaranteed
by the state's Constitution.
Matter of Boso 62 was an appeal taken from a decision of the
Circuit Court of Marshall County holding that Herbert Carl Boso,
an elected member of the Moundsville City Council, was guilty of
official misconduct and ordering his removal from office. The issues arose under Section 11 of the City Charter, providing as follows:
Neither the council nor any of its members shall direct or
request the appointment of any person to, or his removal from
office by the city manager or by any of his subordinates ...
Any councilman violating the provisions of this section shall be
and upon conviction thereof shall cease
guilty of a misdemeanor
2 83
to be a councilman.
The findings of fact by the trial court were that the respondent did
"direct and request" the City Manager to remove the Chief of
Police with the words, "Why don't you fire that damn Chief, of
Police?" Such behavior was held to be official misconduct under
21
29

2
22
28

151 W. Va. 113, 150 S.E.2d 592 (1966).
223 S.E.2d 607 (W.Va. 1976). See 79 W. VA. L. REV. 435 (1977).
233 S.E.2d at 424.
231 S.E.2d 715 (W. Va. 1977).
MOUNDSVILLE, W. VA. CODE § 11 (1956).
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W. Va. Code § 6-6-5,264 which warranted removal from office under
W. Va. Code § 6-6-7.265
The issues on appeal were the amount of evidence required to
remove an official from office and whether the trial court had
found that amount. The requirement of W. Va. Code § 6-6-7 is that
the charge against an official must be established by "satisfactory
proof' in order to remove him. That provision has been construed
by the court as equivalent to the "clear and convincing" standard:
"To warrant removal of an official pursuant to Code 1931, 6-6-7,
clear and convincing evidence must be adduced to meet the statutory requirement of satisfactory proof."26 6 Furthermore, removal
from office "is a drastic remedy and the statutory provision prescribing the grounds for removal is given strict construction."2 7
With these controlling principles in mind, the court looked at
the evidence in the record and concluded that the requisite standard had not been met. Therefore, Respondent Boso was ordered
reinstated to office with back pay.
The only question before the court in Fox v. Board of
Education 6 was whether a teacher's unexcused absence from a
parent-teacher conference constituted a wilful neglect of duty
warranting his dismissal. Appellee had been employed by the
Doddridge County Board of Education for twenty-three years
when he missed a parent-teacher meeting on January 29, 1975.
Charges were brought against him by the County School Superintendent, a hearing was held, and he was fired by unanimous vote
of the county board. The circuit court affirmed his termination.
Upon appeal, the court held that the dismissal had satisfied
procedural due process requirements, but that the punishment did
not fit the misdeed. "The authority of a county board of education
to dismiss a teacher under W. Va. Code, 1931, § 18A-2-8, as
amended, must be based upon the just causes listed therein and
VA. CODE § 6-6-5 (1971 Replacement Vol.) provides: "Any state officer
may be removed from office. . . (b) for official misconduct .. "
255 W. VA. CODE § 6-6-7 (1971 Replacement Vol.) provides: "Any person holding
214 W.

any ...

municipal office ...

may be removed by the circuit court of the county

wherein such officer or person resides ... on any of the grounds, or for any of the
causes, for which a state officer may be removed under section five of this article

(§ 6-6-5) .. "
2,5
257
2-

Evans v. Hutchinson, 214 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1975), Syllabus Point 9.
Smith v. Godby, 154 W. Va. 190, 174 S.E.2d 165 (1970), Syllabus Point 2.
236 S.E.2d 243 (W. Va. 1977).
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26
must be exercised reasonably, not arbitrarily or capriciously.""
Balancing the inconvenience to parents and the embarrassment to
school authorities occasioned by Fox's absence, against the strong
contract interest of a teacher of twenty-three years' experience, the
court concluded that a lesser disciplinary action, such as temporary suspension, would be justified, and ordered reinstatement
with back pay.

The issue in Mason County Board of Education v. State Superintendent of Schoolsno was whether a county board of education
had standing to obtain judicial review of an order of the State
Superintendent of Schools requiring reinstatement of an employee
dismissed by that county board.
On September 1, 1972, the Mason County Board of Education
dismissed one of its school principals under the authority granted
in W. Va. Code, § 18A-2-8.2 11 Since the board decision was not
unanimous, the principal was able to appeal to the State Superintendent of Schools, who issued a reinstatement order. When refused a writ of certiorari from the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County, the board appealed to the supreme court.
The court first established that the Administrative Procedure
Act was not applicable to this case. The State Board of Education
' Beverlin v. Board of Education, 218 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1975), Syllabus
Point 3. The causes listed in the statute are immorality, incompetency, cruelty,
insubordination, intemperance, and wilful neglect of duty. W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-8
(1977 Replacement Vol.).
Fox was charged with the last on the list. Therefore, citation of the Beverlin
principle indicates that the county board erred in exercising its statutory authority
capriciously.
n0 234 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1977).
2, W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-8 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
Suspension and dismissal of school personnel by board.

Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, a board may suspend
or dismiss any person in its employment at any time for: Immorality,
incompetency, cruelty, insubordination, inteniperance or wilful neglect

of duty, but the charges shall be stated in writing and the employee so
affected shall be given an opportunity to be heard by the board upon not
less than ten days' written notice, which charges and notice shall be
served upon the employee within five days of the presentation of the
charges to the board. The hearing may be held at the next regular meeting of the board or at a special meeting called for that purpose; and in

any case when the board is not unanimous in its decision to suspend or
dismiss, the person so suspended or dismissed shall have the right of

appeal to the state superintendent of schools.
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2
is expressly exempted from the Act m
as is its chief executive officer, the State Superintendent of Schools. Nor are county boards
of education subject to the Act, not being state agencies. 3 Furthermore, an Opinion of the Attorney General stated that the
Administrative Procedure Act is not meant to apply to an administrative hearing held by a local board of education.24

Next, the court cited with approval the general rule that in the
absence of statutory authority, an administrative officer or agency
is not entitled to judicial review of an adverse ruling made within
the administrative appellate process of the agency.?8 The reason
is that the final ruling of an agency represents its policy and should
not be attacked from within. The rule was cited but not applied;
whether or not it would prohibit a county board from requesting
judicial review of an appellate administrative decision would
seemingly depend on whether a county board could be considered
a unit within the agency, that agency here being the State Board
of Education. Later in the opinion is the statement that county
boards are virtually independent of the State Superintendent and
are directly answerable to the citizens of the counties. From this
divergence one may presume a lack of control by the' Superintendent over decisions of the county boards,"'6 and a corresponding
right to judicial review of agency decisions, since county school
boards are not "within" the State Board of Education. Presumably
then, the rule was used to support the court's decision to allow the
county school board standing to request judicial review.
Third, the court establishes the lack of legislative guidance for
dealing with the problem of the school boards appeal. The only
applicable statutory provision is W. Va. Code, § 18A-2-8, which
does not provide for appeal from the State Superintendent's decision. "Because of the absence of statutory guidelines," ' the court
turns to precedent. Beverlin v. Board of Education27 held that a
teacher could apply directly for certiorari after dismissal by a
7
county board of education. Also, Smith v. Siders"
I held that where
an employee of a county board appeals his dismissal to the State
22
2'

W. VA. CODE § 29A-1-2 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
W. VA. CODE § 29A-1-1(a) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
-Op. Atty. Gen (June 18, 1975).

z1 234 S.E.2d at 322.
21

234 S.E.2d at 323.

2 234 S.E.2d at 322.
-8 216 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1975).
21 155 W. Va. 193, 183 S.E.2d 433 (1971).
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Superintendent, the county board must be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Although neither case addressed the present problem, the reasoning extended from them is as follows: since
Beverlin gave one party to the employment contract, the board
employee, the right to judicial review of an adverse ruling, that
same right must be extended to the other party to the employment
contract, the school board. Otherwise, one party to the contract
would have an unfair advantage. "Mutuality of remedy is essential
to validity of contract."2 ' Smith, by granting a mandatory right
to be heard to the county board, when its dismissals are appealed
to the State Superintendent, suggests that the county board does
have standing as an interested party. If that is the case, then the
board should have sufficient standing to request judicial review on
its own motion.
The foregoing reasoning led the court to conclude that a
county board of education has standing to obtain judicial review
through a writ of certiorari of an order of the State Superintendent
reinstating an employee dismissed by the board.
"I McGinnis v. Enslow, 140 W. Va. 99, 109, 82 S.E.2d 437, 442 (1954).
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I.

RULES 8, 12 AND 56.

Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co."5 ' presented the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals with an opportunity to discuss the relationship among Rules 8, 12(b)(6) and 56(c) of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure. In this negligence action, the defendant
had initially moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The
trial court denied the motion, ruling the amended complaint sufficient. Defendant then moved for summary judgment pursuant to
Rule 56(c), and affidavits and counter-affidavits were filed by the
parties. Answers to interrogatories and stipulations of fact were
also before the trial court. 2 2 Evaluation of these evidentiary materials led the trial court to conclude that the defendant owed no
legal duty to the plaintiff. Although a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) was before the trial court, it reverted
to Rule 12(b) (6) and granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. The pleadings had not
been amended since the initial motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim had been denied. The Supreme Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that it is error to convert a motion for summary
judgment into a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
particularly where the trial court considers matters outside the
pleadings as a basis for its judgment. The court indicated that,
for purposes of motions to dismiss, inquiry should be directed to
the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).1 4 Citing the landmark case
of Conley v. Gibson,25 the court stated that motions to dismiss are
viewed with disfavor, especially in actions to recover for personal
injuries and further held that the complaint satisfied the requirements of Rule 8.26
-1 236 S.E.2d 207 (W. Va. 1977).

at 209.
Id. at 211. It is arguable the court overstated its position since a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim is presumably countenanced at later stages of
the trial. See W. VA. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Treating a motion for summary judgment
as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
would seem proper, but only if matters outside the pleadings are not considered.
2" W. VA. R. Civ. P. 8(a) provides, in part, that "[a] pleading which sets forth
a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross.claim, or thirdparty claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled."
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
236 S.E.2d at 212.
12Id.

21
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II.

RULEs 17

AND

19.

Housing Authority of Bluefield v. Boggess"' involved an action brought by a local housing authority on a contract it had
executed with the defendant, which required the defendant to provide architectural and related services for the construction and
development of two low-income housing projects. The complaint
alleged negligence, fraud and breach of express and implied warranties. The Department of Housing and Urban Development was
not a party to this contract, although according to an agreement
with the local housing authority, HUD retained significant supervision rights with respect to project construction and defendant's
performance pursuant to the contract with the local housing authority. All necessary funds for the projects were provided by
HUD.m The defendant moved to dismiss the claim contending
that although HUD was not a party to the contract, its control over
the project was so pervasive that it made HUD the only real party
in interest to enforce the obligations of the contract. 89 The trial
court held that HUD's absence was so prejudicial that the action
could not continue and, therefore, dismissed the action. The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed. The court found the
local housing authority to be a viable legal entity whose rights and
obligations arising under the contract with the defendant were not
erased by the presence of HUD.295 In response to the argument that
defendant would be exposed to a risk of multiplicity of suits if
HUD were not the real party in interest, it was noted that the
function of Rule 17 was not to protect defendant's from a risk of
multiplicity of suits but to insure that the plaintiff has a right to
sue even though he may not have all the substantive law rights.
The court indicated that the alleviation of prejudice devolving
upon the defendant from claims that might be made by other real
parties in interest is more properly the function of Rule 19.1,

III.

PROHIBITION-RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL

It is often stated that the writ of prohibition is a matter of
233 S.E.2d 740 (W. Va. 1977).

z Id. at 743.
' Id. at 742.

g' Id. at 743-44.
2' Id. at 744. The court did not decide whether HUD was an indispensable
party pursuant to W. VA. R. Civ. P. 19. The plaintiff had assigned its interests in
the contract to HUD, which subsequently intervened at the appellate level. Id. at

746.
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right, not subject to sound judicial discretion. 9 ' But State ex rel.
West Virginia Truck Stops, Inc. v. McHugh9 3 indicates that equi-

table principles do apply to proceedings in prohibition. In the answer to a complaint filed to enforce a mechanic's lien, the defendant asserted a compulsory counterclaim alleging breach of contract and demanded a jury trial on the factual issues raised
therein. The demand for a jury was denied by the trial court, who
referred the matter to a commissioner. After hearings before the
commissioner had continued from time to time for nearly two
years, the plaintiff rested. This was followed by a motion filed by
the defendant seeking to dismiss the action because it was unconstitutionally being denied a trial by jury, or, alternatively, to suspend proceedings before the commissioner until there had been a
jury determination that the defendant owed money to the plaintiff.
The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the prejudicial effect in terms of time and expense that would accrue if the
proceedings began anew outweighed the injustice that might result
from denying the motion.294 Proceedings in prohibition followed.
Respondent (plaintiff) argued, in part, that laches should bar the
writ of prohibition because it was sought after a delay of nearly two
years from the initial denial of the request for a jury trial. The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals implicitly recognized that the
equitable doctrine of laches applied to proceedings in prohibition
but held that there had not been an intervening change of position
by the respondent induced by the relator. The court observed that
the relator was under no legal obligation to act in any manner
during the period the matter was before the commissioner, and
that mere expiration of time is not the controlling factor in determining whether proceedings in prohibition were instituted in a
timely manner."s Upon the merits of the petition, the court held
that the trial court had exceeded its legitimate powers when it
denied the right to a jury trial 96 on the factual issues raised by the
counterclaim. Consequently, the writ of prohibition was awarded.
212

E.g., State ex rel. Valley Distributors v. Oakley, 153 W. Va. 94, 168 S.E.2d

532 (1969).
23 233 S.E.2d 729 (M. Va. 1977).

21 Id. at 731.
2 Id. at 732.
216 The respondent argued that the mechanic's lien suit is historically an equitable proceeding to which no right to jury trial on factual issues attaches. The court,
without citation or analysis, held that W. VA. CoNST. art. III, § 13, which mandates
the preservation of the right to trial by jury upon demand, entitled the relator to a
jury trial on its counterclaim. Id. at 731.
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PROPERTY
Somon v. Murphy Fabrication& Erection Co. 217 gave rise to

an opportunity to restate and clarify the elements of adverse possession in West Virginia. Factually, the plaintiff and defendant
were involved in a boundary dispute, with plaintiff claiming title
to the area by virtue of one of three theories (1) true ownership,
(2) adverse possession, (3) acquiesence. Plaintiff Somon had
rented this land from his grantor prior to buying it. At the time
Somon obtained the deed in 1953, he and the grantor had walked
the boundary line and had agreed that an old fence, standing in
what later was the disputed area, constituted part of the boundary
line. Following his bonafide belief that he owned the area up to the
fence, plaintiff used and cared for the property, grazing cattle,
hunting, cutting timber and repairing the fence. From a judgment
awarding plaintiff the land on all three theories, the defendant
appealed.
The theories of true ownership and acquiesence were summarily disposed of by the West Virginia Supreme Court. Plaintiff
could not be regarded as the true owner of the property in dispute
because the calls and monuments contained in the two deeds were
harmonious, i.e., the boundary line was clear and Somon's claim
to the disputed property had to rest on another theory. The doctrine of acquiesence was regarded by the Court as arising only
when parties agree to a common line and then proceed to use their
respective properties as if the agreed upon boundary were the actual boundary.298 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
dismissed the doctrine of acquiesence from its consideration because, there was no evidence to show that the parties had indeed
acquiesced to a new boundary.
The Court agreed, however, with the lower court's ruling that
the plaintiff owned the area by virtue of adverse possession. The
elements of adverse possession were stated to be actual, hostile
possession for the statutory period (currently ten years) .21 To qualify as hostile possession, such possession must be open and notorious, adverse to the true owner, exclusive, continuous and under
claim of title or color of right."'
-7 232 S.E.2d 524 (W. Va. 1977).
" ClearFork Coal Co. v. Anchor Coal Co., 111 W. Va. 219, 161 S.E. 229 (1931).
• W. VA. CODE § 55-2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).

For an excellent discussion on the requirements for adverse possession as
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The only contention of the defendant that the Court in Somon
found worthy of note was the Company's claim that if the plaintiff
thought he was the true owner, he could not fit the requirement of
hostile possession necessary to establish adverse possession. The
Somon Court noted that "hostile" meant adverse, rather than malicious, and that actual possession under circumstances reasonably
calculated to give the owner notice of a claim against his title,
would fit the requirements for adverse possession.3 1' Since the
plaintiff had held the area for more than twenty years, his title
ripened into ownership because of the doctrine of adverse possession.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Jones v.
Hudson,3 2 reversed a dismissal of the action and held that since
the writing in question could possibly satisfy the requirements of
the Statute of Frauds, 3 dismissal as a matter of law was error.
The Statute of Frauds"0 4 requires, in pertinent part, that all
contracts for the sale of an interest in realty must be in writing and
signed by the party to be charged with non-performance. In Jones,
there was a writing, and it was signed by both the proposed vendors and vendees of a certain piece of real estate. Mr. Justice
Neely, in writing for a unanimous court, noted that while this
writing satisfied the statutory requirements, throughout the centuries, jurists have engrafted another criterion onto the Statute: contained in this writing must be a certain description of the realty
as to its area and location. However, extrinsic evidence may be
used to make certain that which may be permissibly inferred from
30 5
the words of the writing.

The Court inferred from the writing in dispute that: 1) the
land was probably about one hundred acres in area, 2) the land was
located on Big Run which was probably in Jackson County, 3) the
land was probably a farm, and, 4) defendant-vendors probably
meant to sell land they owned. Therefore, on remand, extrinsic
evidence would be admissible to show if the defendants owned a
construed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, See, Core v. Faupel,
24 W. Va. 238 (1884).
"' 232 S.E.2d at 528.
-2 236 S.E.2d 38 (W. Va. 1977).
.. W. VA. CODE § 36-1-3 (1966).
304 Id.
35 For cases representative of the application of this doctrine in West Virginia,
See, Holley's Executor v. Curry, 58 W. Va. 70, 51 S.E. 135 (1905); and White v.
Core, 20 W. Va. 272 (1882).
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farm, in Jackson County, on Big Run, around one hundred acres
in size. If these inferences are established, then the writing would
be a specifically enforceable contract.
The issue involved in Wheeling DollarSavings & Trust Co. v.
Hanes," was whether or not adopted children were to be included
in the distribution of the principal from a trust.
Pertinent provisions of the West Virginia Code" that were
enacted in 1969, insure that adoptive children will be treated as
natural children of their adoptive parents for all purposes. The
inter vivos trust involved in Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co.
was executed in 1938. Two cases308 which dealt with the right of
adoptive children to take under inter vivos or testamentary trusts
had held that for those trusts executed prior to the enactment of
the 1969 code section, adoptive children were not deemed natural
children of a beneficiary in order to share in the distribution of the
corpus.
Mr. Justice Neely, in writing for the Court, specifically overruled those two cases, and held that regardless of the date of execution of the trust instrument, and whether the trust was testamentary or inter vivos, adopted children were to be included in the
distribution of the principal, unless the language of the instrument
evidenced a clear intent on the part of the settlor or testator to
exclude adopted children.
The Court pointed to, as part of the basis for its decision, the
increasing pervasiveness of adoption, and to the fact that adopted
children become as natural children, emotionally and financially.
The Court also noted that the purpose of a trust is generally to
benefit those whom the testator roves, and that if alive, the settlor,
in all likelihood, would love the adopted child as much as any
natural child.
237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977).
W. VA. CODE § 48-4-5 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (as enacted 1969). One form or

another of this statute has been in effect since 1882. The statute makes adopted
children "natural" children of their adoptive parents for all purposes, and excludes
adoptive children from any estate of inheritance or any obligation whatsoever toward their biological parents. The Court pointed to the lengthy existence of this
statute as evidence of the legislative intent to make adopted children completely
equal to and synonymous with natural children.
"I Security NationalBank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 151 W. Va. 429, 153 S.E.2d
114 (1967); Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 128 W. Va. 703, 37
S.E.2d 563 (1946).
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In Johnson v. JuniorPocahontasCoal Co., Inc.,3 9 surface owners of land attempted to recover for damages to their property
occasioned by an independent contractor's alleged negligence in
strip-mining nearby land. The plaintiffs held their land by a deed
expressly subject to exculpatory clauses in their chain of title insulating the mineral owner from liability for such property damage.
The mineral owner leased the coal for removal purposes to a company which then engaged the defendant to strip-mine the coal. The
issue, therefore, was whether the clauses protecting the mineral
owner extended to the independent contractor. The plaintiffs'
complaint alleges injury to their real estate, and improvements
thereon, as a result of wilful and wanton conduct in drilling and
blasting, and asks for actual and compensatory, punitive and treble damages.
The majority analyzed the case in terms of privity: while privity of estate existed between the coal owner and the lessee company, only privity of contract existed between the lessee and its
independent contractor. The defendant held no estate or interest
in the coal but was merely under a contractual obligation to remove it. The rule is that privity of contract alone will not carry the
benefit of a convenant. 10 Therefore, the benefit of the exculpatory
clause did pass from the mineral owner to the lessee with the
leasehold estate, but did not pass from the lessee to the defendant
because they lacked privity of estate. Accordingly, the narrow
holding of the court was that the independent contractor was not
insulated from tort liability, and the case was remanded for resolution.
Justice Neely, vigorously dissenting from the majority's privity analysis and criticizing it as a technicality resulting in "nice
31
legal distinctions which give the appearance of applied logic," 1
confronts the issue as being whether the exculpatory clauses are
valid. In his view, the line drawn at privity of contract, beyond
which a covenant will not pass with the property is an arbitrary
distinction which would prevent the use of independent contractors by owners of mineral interests. He relies on the Restatement
of Property § 530-§ 537 (1944) to establish that the burden of the
promise of exculpation from liability did run through their chain
of title to the plaintiffs; and on § 542 of the same work to show that..
319
3,0
"

234 S.E.2d 309 (W. Va. 1977).
20 Am. Jua.2d, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, § 34 (1965).
234 S.E.2d at 320.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol80/iss1/7

58

Bowman et al.: Survey of Develpoments in West Virginia Law: 1977

SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS

171

the benefits of the promise respecting such use of the land without
liability extended to the lessee. The dissenting opinion then draws
the line at the same place as the majority, but the reason is that
the defendant is a "servant" of the lessee, in an "employment
relationship" which does not involve "land covenants or rights to
property.

' 31 2

Therefore, covenants such as the exculpatory clauses,

extend only to parties having rights to the property, excluding the
independent contractor. It is essentially the same analysis made
by the majority, reaching the same result, but done in a more
careful, logical progression and without using the word "privity."
312

Id.
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TORTS
In Freshwater v. Booth,3 ' the Supreme Court of Appeals
sought to clarify the rules for handling inadequate jury awards.
The instant case involved an automobile accident. The damages
sought by the plaintiffs included stipulated special damages and
damages for pain and suffering. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiffs for the exact amount of the stipulated special damages,
but made no award for any pain and suffering, which the court
found had been conclusively proven at trial. The trial court entered
judgment on the jury verdict, and the plaintiffs appealed.
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
case to the circuit court for a new trial on all the issues. The court
held that in a case where (1) liability was strongly contested, (2)
there was sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict for plaintiffs or
defendants, (3) the jury's award of damages was inadequate, and
(4) where the defendant's liability had been proven, a court cannot determine whether the jury was mistaken as to the rules for
determining liability or as to the proper measure of damages. In
such a case, the court cannot infer whether, upon a new trial, the
jury would find in favor of the plaintiff or the
defendant, and a new
31
trial on all the issues is the proper course.

1

The court also noted three other typical classes of cases involving inadequate jury damage awards. The first was the situation
where the plaintiff would have been entitled to a directed verdict
on the issue of liability, but the jury verdict was obviously inadequate when viewed most favorably for the defendant. In that case,
the court said the case should be remanded on the issue of damages
alone. 31 5 Closely akin to the above situation was the case in which,
although the plaintiff would not be entitled to a directed verdict,
the question of liability was conclusively proved by the plaintiff.
When that is the circumstance, the court can reasonably infer that
any inadequate jury award was the result of error with regard to
the proper measure of damages and should remand the case for a
new trial on the issue of damages alone.3 1

313233 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1977).
3,, Id. at 316, citing King v. Bittinger, 231 S.E.2d 239 (W. Va. 1976).
3,1 Id. at 315, citing Delong v. Albert, 205 S.E.2d 683 (W. Va. 1974); Hall v.
Groves, 151 W. Va. 449, 153 S.E.2d 165 (1967).
"I Id. at 317, citing Keiffer v. Queen, 155 W. Va. 868, 189 S.E.2d 842 (1972);
Biddle v. Haddix, 154 W. Va. 748, 179 S.E.2d 215 (1971); England v. Shufflebarger,
152 W. Va. 662, 166 S.E.2d 126 (1969); Richmond v. Campbell, 148 W. Va. 595,
136 S.E.2d 877 (1964).
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The final type of case involving inadequate jury awards was
where defendant's verdict was perversely expressed. This involved
a situation where liability was tenuous or strongly contested, and
the jury award was so inadequate as to be nominal under the
circumstances. Because the jury award was nominal, the court
found that it is reasonable to infer in such cases that the jury's
mistake was made on the issue of liability, and that it was entitled
to accept the nominal award as a defendant's verdict perversely
expressed." '
Jarrett v. E.L. Harper & Son, Inc."8 was a case of two major
issues. One involved an application of W. Va. R. C. P. 68 and the
other was the measure of damages for injury to real property.
Defendant-contractor destroyed plaintiffs' water well while
building a sewer, resulting in the plaintiffs being without water
during the five weeks that work was being done on a new well.
Plaintiffs sued Harper & Son, demanding a jury trial, for $5000.00
to recover the new well cost of $766.82, expenses for carrying water
from a neighbor, and compensation for their annoyance and inconvenience. The defendant confessed judgment for $882.12 to cover
the cost of the new well plus $115.30 for out-of-pocket expenses
including the cost of buckets and payment for the use of a laundromat. The trial judge immediately entered judgment for plaintiffs
for $882.12, denying the other elements of damage. The Supreme
Court of Appeals held this action to be error, based on Rule 68 and
on the jury trial demand. The rule provides that a defendant's offer
of judgment, which only partially satisfies the plaintiffs' claim and
which is rejected or accepted as part payment only, must be considered by the court to have been withdrawn; in such case the
circuit court should have then proceeded with the jury trial.
Injuries to real property have been classified, with some problems, as temporary or permanent. Confusion has arisen both in
classifying the damage and in applying the proper rule of damages.3 19 The court took this opportunity to overrule cases using the
old differentiation between temporary and permanent damage to
real property, and to enunciate a new principle:
3,1 Id. at 316-17, citing Shields v. Church Brothers, Inc., 156 W. Va. 312, 193
S.E.2d 151 (1972); Haffner v. Cross, 116 W. Va. 562, 182 S.E. 573 (1935).
, 235 S.E.2d 362 (W. Va. 1977).
3,9 See Cline v. Paramount Pacific Inc., 153 W. Va. 600, 170 S.E.2d 577 (1969),
and Manley v. Brown, 90 W. Va. 564, 111 S.E. 505 (1922).
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When realty is injured the owner may recover the cost of repairing it plus his expenses stemming from the injury including loss
of use during the repair period. If the injury cannot be repaired
or the cost of repair would exceed the property's market value,
then the owner may recover the money equivalent of its lost
value plus his expenses resulting from the injury including loss
of use during the time he has been deprived of his property.2 0
Applying this new rule to the present case, the plaintiffs could
recover the cost of the new well, out-of-pocket expenses stemming
from the injury, plus compensation for loss of use. The latter element is usually equal to lost profits or lost rental value; however,
when that standard is inappropriate because the property was not
used commercially, "annoyance" and "inconvenience" may properly be considered. This new twist was based on two old out-ofstate cases,32' indicating that the court wanted to establish the
availability of damages for discomfort caused by injury to real
property.
Justice Neely concurred specifically322 to applaud the allowance of damages for inconvenience. Stating that the rule here announced "probably also applies" to inconvenience from injury to
personal property, he looked forward to jury verdicts against insurance companies for the annoyance and inconvenience of being
without one's automobile while the insurance company delays payment for repairs. Hopefully, the effect will be quicker settlement
of property damage claims by insurance carriers, to mitigate possible annoyance and inconvenience damages.
3

235 S.E.2d at 365.

=' Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928). See also
City of Richmond v. Wright, 151 Va. 964, 145 S.E. 732 (1928).
12 235 S.E.2d at 366.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
I.

COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES

The compensability formula of the West Virginia Workmen's
Compensation Act requires that employees sustain "personal injuries in the course of and resulting from their covered employment" as a condition precedent to entitlement to the benefits
afforded by the Act. Ware v. State Workmen's Compensation
Comm'r3u presented a novel question dealing with the "resulting

from" segment of the formula. The claimant's work station consisted of a raised platform adjacent to a conveyor and from which the
claimant packed glassware. Located behind the claimant was a
metal table stacked with the boxes used to pack the glassware.
While standing on the raised platform, the claimant fell backwards
from the platform, across the metal table and onto the concrete
floor sustaining severe injuries. Evidence introduced by the claimant was to the effect that the platform, which was not attached to
the floor, changed positions causing her to lose her balance and
fall. The employer's evidence tended to show that the fall was a
result, not of the platform, but of a dizzy spell brought on by a preexisting inner-ear disorder. The employer argued that the injuries
resulted from the claimant's pre-existing physical condition rather
than from the employment. The Commissioner's order awarded
3 The West Virginia
compensation and the Appeal Board reversed.2
Supreme Court of Appeals avoided resolving the factual dispute,
holding the injuries compensable under either version of the cause
of the fall. 2' The court ruled that, if the fall were indeed idiopathic,
the employment nonetheless contributed to the risk of, or aggravation to, the injury from the fall. The raised position of the platform
and the presence of the metal table and the concrete floor12 were
conditions of the employment whose cumulative effect was to place
the claimant in a position that increased the dangerous effects of
the idiopathic fall. With this case, West Virginia joined a majority
of jurisdictions, which hold that the effects of idiopathic falls are
r W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).

234 S.E.2d 778 (W. Va. 1977).
- Id.
=' Id. at 779.
The court expressly indicated that the effects of an idiopathic fall might not
be compensable where the only employment-related factor that increased the dangerousness of the fall was a hard floor. Id. A majority of the jurisdictions that have
considered that issue have denied compensation. 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATON § 12.10 (desk ed. 1976).
"
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compensable where there are employment-related factors that increase the dangers of the employee's fall.328
A long-standing judicial overlay to the compensability formula is the requirement that the personal injuries occur "by
accident." ' 9 This may be shown by proof that the disability was
attributable to a "definite, isolated, and fortuitous occurrence"3 0
or by demonstrating that the disability was the unexpected result
of the performance of a usual or ordinary duty of the employment.13 This is an evolving area of the workmen's compensation
law in West Virginia, 33 2 primarily because of the function it serves.
It has been argued that the concept functions not so much to insure
that the circumstances resulting in the disability were of a fortuitous or accidental quality but, rather as an added assurance that
compensation will not be awarded for disabilities that are not, to
any substantial degree, caused by the employment.3"
Charlton v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r 334 is an
example of a case where the employee proved that his disability
was precipitated by the conditions of his employment yet was unable to demonstrate that the factual circumstances resulting in the
disability met the requirements of the traditional "by accident"
analysis. The employee worked while standing in coal treatment
water, and after five or six months on the job his feet became
massively scarred and ulcerated. Medical evidence established
that: (1) the employee was suffering from Buerger's Disease, (2)
Buerger's Disease is not an occupational disease, and (3) although
Buerger's Disease is not an occupational disease, the conditions of
the employment had probably precipitated or aggravated the disease. 335 The Commissioner denied the claim for compensation,
holding that the disability was not due to an occupational disease
• Larson, supra note 5, § 12.10.
' E.g., Jordan v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 191 S.E.2d 497
(W. Va. 1972); Martin v. State Compensation Comm'r, 107 W. Va. 583, 149 S.E.
824 (1929).
"I Jordan v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 191 S.E.2d 497 (W. Va.
1972).
.1 Pennington v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 222 S.E.2d 579 (W.
Va. 1976) (back strain-incurred while performing usual duties).
"I See Survey of Developments-Workmen's Compensation, 79 W. Va. L. Rev.
503, 506 (1977).
1 A. LARSON, supra note 5 § 38.80 at 7-29 (desk ed. 1976).
' 236 S.E.2d 241 (W. Va. 1977).
Id. at 242.
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received in the course of and resulting from the employment. 36 The
Appeal Board affirmed but did acknowledge the working in the
coal treatment water perhaps aggravated the employee's preexisting condition. The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded to the Commissioner. The court cited precedent =7 that
awarded compensation to employees whose pre-existing Buerger's
Disease was aggravated or accelerated by an injury received in the
course of and resulting from their employment, thereby causing
disability sooner than would otherwise have occurred. However,
both of the cases cited involved pre-existing Buerger's Disease that
was aggravated by injuries that could be described as "definite,
isolated and fortuitous occurence[s]."338 In Charlton, the disease
was aggravated or precipitated gradually over a five or six month
period. The court offered no analysis of the "by accident" requirement, presumably because of the medical evidence strongly establishing that the conditions of the employment precipitated or aggravated the pre-existing disease, thus resulting in a disabling condition sooner than would have occurred with a normal progression
of the disease."'
I1.

THE LIBERALITY RULE

The remedial character of the workmen's compensation law is
the basis for a spirit of liberality that favors the employee both in
statutory construction and in the appraisal of evidence. 4 One area
in which the rule operates is attribution of disability to injury. The
=' A disease must be such that it can fairly be traced to the employment as
the proximate cause in order for it to be deemed to have been incurred in the course
of and resulting from the employment and compensable as an occupational disease.
See W. Va. Code § 23-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
31 Hall v. Compensation Commissioner, 110 W. Va. 551, 159 S.E. 516 (1931)
(toe injury caused by falling object); Manning v. State Compensation Commissioner, 124 W. Va. 620, 22 S.E.2d 299 (1942) (isolated injury to hand while operating
crane).
ul Jordan v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r 191 S.E.2d 497, 501 (W.
Va. 1972). See also Hall v. Compensation Comm'r, 110 W. Va. 551, 552, 159 S.E.
516, 517 (1931) where the court states: "[ijf the loss of claimant's limbs were due
to the disease, unaggravated or unaccelerated by any fortuitous event which may
be denominated an accident, then, in view of the statute, the injury is not compensable."
:1 See Charlton v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 236 S.E.2d 241,
243 (W. Va. 1977).
-11 See, e.g., Johnson v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 155 W. Va.
624, 186 S.E.2d 771 (W. Va. 1972). See generally Comment, The Demise of the
Liberality Rule? 77 W. Va. L. Rev. 370 (1975).
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law presumes that a disability resulted from a given injury if the
disability cannot, with some degree of certainty, be attributed to
a cause other than that injury."'
343
the
In Dunlap v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r,
issue:
a
similar
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals dealt with
the attribution of a specific injury to a given industrial accident.
In Dunlap, the employee sustained an injury to his back while
pulling steel rods. His initial complaints consisted of pain in the
neck, shoulder and arm. Diagnosis of the pain experienced in the
neck was an intervertebral disk injury, for which surgery was performed. Six months later, the claimant secured employment with
a different employer but ceased working a short time thereafter
because of pain experienced in the arm, shoulder and, in addition,
the low back area. Subsequent examination by the same treating
physicians indicated residual disability, a result of the cervical
injury and a lumbosacral strain. 43 During these examinations,
after the brief employment with the subsequent employer had discontinued, the claimant informed one of the physicians that the
low back injury occurred during his employment with the original
employer. The claimant also maintained that position at two hearings before the Commissioner. Medical evidence, however, could
not connect the lumbosacral strain to the cervical disk injury; nor
did the medical records indicate that the claimant had made any
complaints involving the low back area after the accident that had
occurred during the employment with the original employer. The
Commissioner's order disposed of the claim without reaching the
attribution issue. The Appeal Board affirmed but in its opinion
stated that while the record was not clear, it appeared that the
lumbosacral strain was unrelated to the accident that occurred
during the employment with the original employer. 44 The court
reversed, holding that where an injured employee provides some
evidence demonstrating that a specific injury did arise from a
given accident, it will be presumed to have resulted from such
accident unless evidence exists which, to some degree of3certainty,
5
attributes the injury to a cause other than the accident. 1
31, Sisk v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 153 W. Va. 461, 170
S.E.2d 20 (1969) (psychiatric disability attributed to physical injury).
312 232 S.E.2d 343 (W. Va. 1977).
3
Id. at 344.
3,1 Id.
3
Id. at 346. The court noted that the presumption is not a substitute for proof
and that the employee must supply evidence that the injury arose from the acci-
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III.

REOPENING CLAIMS FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES

An injured employee may petition for further adjustment of
his claim by submitting a written application to the Commissioner. 46 The grounds necessary for further adjustment are progression or aggravation of the claimant's condition, or some fact or
facts which had not been considered by the Commissioner in his
former findings and which would entitle the injured employee to
greater benefits than he has already received247 If the application
fails to establish a prima facie cause for reopening the claim, the
petition is denied. 4 s Harper v. State Workmen's Compensation
Comm'r34' involved the character or degree of proof that must be
contained in the written application to demonstrate a prima facie
cause for reopening claims for further adjustment. The claimant
had previously been awarded a 15% permanent partial disability
award for occupational pneumoconiosis. In connection with his
application for reopening,- a medical report was submitted which
outlined numerous phhysical disabilities. The report also indicated that the claimant was suffering from a chronic neurosis and
that the physical disabilities had contributed significantly to that
impairment. The report's conclusion was that if the claimant was
suffering from an occupational disease such as pneumoconiosis,
psychiatric impairment should be considered as approximately
40%. 111 The Appeal Board affirmed the Commissioner's denial of
the petition for reopening, taking the view that the medical report
was not sufficiently precise to demonstrate that the psychiatric
impairment was causally related to the occupational pneumoconiosis. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a prima facie cause for reopening is demonstrated where
any evidence is submitted which tends to justify, but not compel,
the inference that there has been a progression or aggravation of
the former injury."'
dent. However, the quantum of evidence necessary to create the presumption apparently need only be minimal, since the medical evidence was inconclusive and
the injury, along with the claimant's attribution of it to the accident, appeared a
significant time after the accident had occurred.
" W. Va. Code § 23-5-1(a) (1973 Replacement Vol.).
'7 See W. Va. Code § 23-5-1(b) (1973 Replacement Vol.).
31 Id.; Backus v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 154 W. Va. 79, 173
S.E.2d 353 (1970).
" 234 S.E.2d 779 (W. Va. 1977).
0 'Id.
"' Id. at 783. The court indicated that this standard would also apply to the
alternate ground for reopening disability claims: where there exists facts not pre-
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The issue presented in Ford v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r352 involved the reopening of occupational pneumoconiosis claims. In both of the consolidated cases, the employee had
received a permanent, partial award for occupational pneumoconiosis. Each claimant continued his employment, although one of
the two claimants continued with a different employer. At least
two years subsequent from the date of initial filing for pneumoconiosis, each claimant filed a second application for occupational
penumoconiosis benefits. In each of the cases, the employer contended that since essentially the same period of exposure was involved, the employee must seek a reopening of the previous claim
as opposed to filing a new claim. The Appeal Board in each case
held that the employee could only seek a reopening of the previous
claim. 153 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that each claimant had the right to seek either a reopening
of the previous claim or to file a new claim for occupational pneumoconiosis2 The court recognized that section 23-4-6(a) of the
West Virginia Code 355 expressly makes applicable to claims for
occupational pneumoconiosis the "reopening for further adjustment" provisions of sections 23-5-1(a)-(d) of the West Virginia
Code.36 The court, however, interpreted that provision as an additional, rather than exclusive, method of adjusting prior claims.
The basis for holding that the claimants had the alternate right to
file new claims was the statutory inclusion of occupational pneu35
moconiosis in the terms "injury" and "personal injury""
and a
statutory provision that deems the date of injury in occupational
pneumoconiosis cases as the date of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease.3 5 Since occupational pneumoconiosis is an
"injury" and the "date of injury" is the date of the last exposure,
any subsequent exposure to the hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis gives a claimant the option to treat such exposure as a new
359
and separate injury.
viously considered by the Commissioner in his former findings. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
236 S.E.2d 234 (W. Va. 1977).
3 Id. at 234-35.
33 Id. at 235.
3 W. Va. Code § 23-4-6(a) (1973 Replacement Vol.).
= W. Va. Code § 23-5-1(a)-(d) (1973 Replacement Vol.).
31 W. Va. Code § 23-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
' W. Va. Code § 23-4-14 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
31 In order for compensation to be payable for occupational pneumoconiosis,
the employee must have been exposed to the hazards of the disease in West Virginia
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IV.

SUCCESSIVE DISABILITIES

In Akers v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r.,360 the
claimant had sustained numerous compensable and noncompensable injuries prior to 1972. In 1972, the claimant filed a claim
for occupational pneumoconiosis but continued in the same employment. For the purposes of the workmen's compensation law,
this injury was deemed to have occurred on the date the claim was
filed.3 1' In 1974, while the claim for occupational pneumoconiosis
was pending, the claimant sustained an injury which resulted in a
25% permanent partial disability award. Subsequently, the Appeal
Board awarded the claimant a 40% permanent partial disability
award for the pneumoconiosis claim and, since the claimant's disability rating exceeded 85%, additionally awarded the claimant a
permanent total disability award.3 62 The employer contended that
it should be charged only with the 1974 injury, since that 25%
permanent partial disability award, when combined with the existing 65% disability rating, exceeded 85%. When an employee becomes totally and permanently disabled through the combined
effect of prior disabilities and a second injury, the employer is
normally charged only with the second injury.3 13 Therefore, the
employer asserted that the 40% permanent partial disability award
for pneumoconiosis should be chargeable to the second injury reserve. The Appeal Board assessed both the 1972 and 1974 disability
awards to the employer's account. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that both disability awards
were second injuries since both occurred in the course of employment with that employer. 64 The court relied upon McClanahanv.
State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r 35 which recognized that
the second injury reserve scheme was not designed or intended to
"over a continuous period of not less than two years during the ten years immediately preceding the date of his last exposure to such hazards, or for any five of the
fifteen years immediately preceding the date of last exposure." W. VA. CODE § 234-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
232 S.E.2d 347 (W. Va. 1977).
' The date of last exposure is taken as the date of injury. W.Va. Code § 23-414 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Since the claimant continued working, the Commissioner
substituted date of filing for date of last exposure. 232 S.E.2d at 348.
31 Employees qualify for permanent total disability, payable from the second
injury reserve, when a compensable injury causes their cumulative disability rating
to exceed 85%. W. VA. CODE § 23-3-1 (1973 Replacement Vol.).
' W. VA. CODE § 23-3-1 (1973 Replacement Vol.).
'

232 S.E.2d at 349.

207 S.E.2d 184 (W. Va. 1974).
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relieve an employer of any liability for injuries that occur during
the course of employment with that employer." 6
At issue in Cropp v. State Workmen's Compensation
Comm'r.3- 7 was the question of whether an employee who had previously been granted a permanent total disability award was entitled to additional benefits for an injury which occurred in the
course of and resulted from his continued employment with the
same employer. The employee's claim for medical expenses and a
temporary total disability award were denied by the Commissioner
on the ground that additional workmen's compensation benefits
were precluded by the prior award of permanent total disability."'
The Appeal Board affirmed the order and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed. The court began its analysis by
indicating that the initial inquiry with respect to the availability
of benefits is always whether the injury satisfies the basic compensability requirement that it occur in the course of and resulting
from the employment.3 9 The compensability standard having been
satisfied, the question then is whether there are provisions in the
Act which limit or preclude the receipt of benefits subsequent to
an award of permanent total disability.
Regarding the receipt of medical benefits, the court determined that the only limitation upon payment contained in the
applicable statutory provision, section 23-4-3 of the West Virginia
Code,370 is that medical benefits do not commence until the injury
is found to be compensable, a limitation found inapplicable since
the injury had met the compensability standard. 7' The court
found the prevailing rule in other jurisdictions persuasive:"'2 the
availability of medical benefits is unaffected by income benefit
rights under disability provisions. Consequently, the court held
"I In Griffith v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 205 S.E.2d 157 (W.
Va. 1974), the court indicated that the purpose of the second injury reserve scheme
was simply to encourage the employment of workers with previous disabilities. The
rule prevents the unfair impact that would otherwise devolve upon employers if the
entire disability resulting from the combination of the prior disabilities and the
present injury were changeable to the current employer.
" 236 S.E.2d 480 (W. Va. 1977).
" Id. at 481.
" See W. Va. Code § 23-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
wOW. Va. Code § 23-4-3 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
"1 236 S.E.2d at 482.
311Cited as authority: Depue v. Barsh Truck Lines, 493 P.2d 80 (Okla. 1972);
Brooks v. Arkansas Best Freight System, Inc., 247 Ark. 61, 444 S.W.2d 246 (1969);
2 A. LARSON, Workmen's Compensation § 61.11 (desk ed. 1972).
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that the claimant was entitled to medical benefits for the injury
despite the prior award for permanent total disability.113
Availability of temporary total disability benefits to a claimant receiving permanent total disability benefits for a prior injury
presents a more intricate issue because the two compensation payments would exceed a seemingly applicable maximum weekly payment limitation. 7 4 The employer relied upon Dunlap v. State
37 5
Workmen's Compensation Director
for the proposition that this
duplication of benefits was improper. Dunlap involved a claimant
who received temporary total disability benefits until permanent
total disability benefits were awarded. The claimant sought to
compel payment of this latter award as of the date of injury instead
of the date of the award. The court in that case held that overlap
would result in payments in excess of the statutory weekly award
limit."' The court distinguished Dunlap on the ground it dealt
with duplicative benefits for but one injury, whereas the instant
case dealt with two separate injuries.3 77 The court further held that
the maximum weekly award limit was inapplicable where there are
two separate compensable injuries. This conclusion resulted primarily from an interpretation of section 23-4-6 of the West Virginia
Code. 37 8 The court viewed a provision that precludes offset of temporary total disability benefits against permanent partial disability benefits to specifically deal with deductibility of temporary
total disability benefits from permanent total disability awards.379
3 236 S.E.2d at 482.
37 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(k) (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides that "[c]ompensation
payable under any subdivision of this section shall not exceed the maximum nor
be less than the weekly benefits specified in subdivision (b) of this section." W. VA.
CODE § 23-4-6(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977) sets disability benefits payable for injuries that
cause temporary total disability.
m 149 W. Va. 266, 140 S.E.2d 448 (1965).
3 Id. The limiting provision then applicable was W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(h)
(1965).
"1 236 S.E.2d at 483.
W8 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
31 The court reasoned that prior to an amendment in 1974, W. VA. CODE § 234-6(j) (1973 Replacement Vol.) provided that temporary total disability benefits
could not be deducted from either permanent partial disability awards or permanent total disability awards. Since the 1974 amendment stated that temporary total
disability payments can be deducted from permanent partial disability awards but
omitted any mention of deductibility from permanent total disability awards, the
court was persuaded that the inference with respect to legislative intent, was that
temporary total disability benefits can be deducted from permanent total disability
awards. This argument is somewhat tenuous since its premise is incorrect. Prior to
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The maximum weekly award limit was found not controlling because it is a general provision that does not specifically address
itself to the issue of deductibility. 3 1 Although the offset provision
was viewed as applying specifically to the deductibility issue, it
does not do so, since it neither authorizes nor prohibits the duplication of disability benefits. Apparently, the court held that the
claimant was entitled to temporary total disability benefits because the compensability standard was met and no provision of the
Act precluded payment of the benefits. The argument was advanced that a man can be no more than totally disabled, and that
duplication of disability benefits may make it more profitable for
him to be disabled than to be well. This was rejected on two
grounds: (1) the Act recognizes that an injured employee may
receive permanent total disability benefits and yet possess sufficient skills to work,38 ' and (2) the position is a moral argument in
a compensation scheme that is purely statutory. 2
In Dunlap v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r.,311
the question presented was whether the receipt of temporary
total disability benefits should terminate where the claimant
resumes employment but soon thereafter is physically unable
to continue working because of residual disability related to the
injury giving rise to the temporary total disability benefits. The
Commissioner's order that the benefits terminate was affirmed
by the Appeal Board.3 84 The West Virginia Supreme Court of
1974, W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(j) (1973 Replacement Vol.) dealt only with permanent

partial disability awards. The 1974 amendment simply redesignated the provision
§ 6(1).
'The court viewed W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977), which concerns compensation for permanent partial disabilities, as support for its position
that the maximum weekly award limit was not intended to be a limition upon all
disability benefits payable under, § 23-4-6, since subsection (e) contains a separate
schedule of weekly benefit limits for permanent partial disability benefits. Realistically, however, subsection (e) is of limited support because the maximum benefits
obtainable for permanent partial disabilities are significantly less than those provided for in § 23-4-6(b), which constitutes the maximum weekly award limit for any
disability. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(k) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
-1 In determining the issue of total disability, an inability to engage in employment that requires skills and abilities comparable to those of any gainful activity
the injured employee has previously engaged in must be considered. See W. VA.
CODE § 23-4-6(n) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
30 236 S.E.2d at 484.
3
232 S.E.2d 343 (W. Va. 1977). For a discussion of a separate issue contained
in this case, see text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
3" Id. at 344.
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Appeals reversed. Noting the absence of any statutory provision
concerning the effect of an attempt to return to work upon temporary total disability benefits, 3 5 the court was persuaded that a
valid social policy could be furthered by encouraging an attempt
to return to work. If the attempt is successful, the period of disability is reduced, thereby restoring the claimant to his former wage
level and diminishing the employer's compensation exposure.3
The court stated that potential abuse would be minimized by statutory safeguards1 7 that enable the Commissioner to determine if
cessation of work in these circumstances is a result of the injury
giving rise to the temporary total disability benefits.3 8
Joseph W. Bowman
Thomas Evans
Janet Archer Goodwin
Laura Jane Kelly
Kenneth E. Tawney
The court indicated that the use of the words "during the continuance
thereof" and "aggregate award" inW. VA. CODE §§ 23-4-6(b)-(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977)
suggest that the legislative intent was that temporary total disability need not be
limited to a continuous period of disability.
232 S.E.2d at 345.
* The Commissioner has authority to order a physical examination of the
cliamant when,'in his opinion, it is necessary. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-8 (Cum. Supp.
1977). The Commissioner also has continuing jurisdiction to make such modifications in his findings and orders as are justified. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-16 (Cum. Supp.
1977). Finally, aggregate awards for temporary total disability are limited to a
period not exceeding 208 weeks. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
236 S.E.2d at 345.
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